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THE VALIDITY OF NON-EPISCOPAL ORDINATION ¹

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"The fourth and last lecture," said Judge Dudley, "I would have for the maintaining, explaining, and proving the validity of the ordination of ministers or pastors of the churches, and so their administration of the sacraments or ordinances of religion as the same hath been practised in New England, from the first beginning of it, and so continued at this day. Not that I would in any wise invalidate Episcopal Ordination, as it is commonly called and practised in the Church of England; but I do esteem the method of ordination as practised in Scotland, at Geneva, and among dissenters in England, and in the churches in this country, to be very safe, Scriptural, and valid; and that the great Head of the Church, by his blessed spirit, hath owned, sanctified, and blessed them accordingly, and will continue to do so to the end of the World. Amen."

I

The reluctance of good Churchmen to acknowledge the validity of non-Episcopal orders is due in part to a confusion of inspiration with direction.

¹The Dudleian Lecture at Harvard University, April 8, 1919. This was one of the last public utterances of the late Dean Hodges. He died May 27, 1919.

There are two theories concerning the making of the church, as there are two theories concerning the making of the world. According to one theory the church was made by special creation, that is, by the personal and definite direction of Jesus Christ. According to the other theory the church was made by processes of evolution; it came into being not like a house but like a tree. A house begins with plans and specifications, and is erected from the first stone of the cellar to the last shingle of the roof in conformity with these prearranged details. But a tree grows. It begins with the mysterious presence of life in a seed, and is shaped thereafter by manifold conditions of sun and rain, of light and shade, of soil and changing seasons. Thus Christ planted his gospel in the souls of men, and it grew into the church. He contributed the initial inspiration of his personality and his message, and the men whom he inspired did the rest; assisted indeed by reference to him and by prayer, but meeting each new situation according to their best judgment, assuring themselves as well as they could of his approval.

A right choice between these theories depends on the New Testament facts. In favor of the direction-theory is the fact that the apostles, up to the end of the Gospels, appear to be dependent persons, without originality or initiative, doing as their Master bade them. He sent them out on experimental missions, the details of which he carefully arranged, even to the provision of the coats upon their backs and the shoes upon their feet. May we not fairly infer that he used a like care regarding that supreme mission for which his whole intercourse with them was a preparation, in furtherance of which they established the church? Was it not with these matters that he was occupied after his resurrection, when, as we are told, he spent forty days with the apostles, "speaking of the things pertaining to the kingdom of God"? Is it

not likely that he instructed them regarding the number and nature of the sacraments, perhaps regarding the ritual of the services, and certainly concerning the orders of the ministry and the transmission of grace by an apostolic succession?

On the other hand, against the direction-theory and in favor of the inspiration-theory, is the fact that the apostles in the beginning of the Acts have no church-ideas. It is true that they baptize; but so did John the Baptist, who was not only no churchman but can hardly be called a Christian. St. Paul, who was not usually austere in matters ecclesiastical, took the disciples of John and rebaptized them, making them begin over again at the beginning. It is true that the apostles observe the feast of the breaking of the bread; but this was a common Jewish custom, kept every week in every devout Jewish household on the eve of the Sabbath. It is true that these baptized persons who are described as breaking bread from house to house are already called "the church": "The Lord added to the church daily such as should be saved." But the word *ecclesia*, which occurs only two times in the Gospels, and both of those times in St. Matthew, may mean there and here only a fraternity or community within the Jewish Church. There is nothing to show that the addition of these disciples to "the church" differed in any material way from the enlistment of mediæval men and women in the Order of St. Francis. On the contrary, the whole situation implies that such an act as a separation from the ancient church and an erection of an independent church apart from the Aaronic succession, had no place whatever in the apostolic mind. The idea that the apostles and their followers proceeded naturally and immediately into schism, and lightly went out of the church whose foundations were in the Holy Scripture, and apart from which, according to common belief, there was no salvation, may

be held indeed by dissenters to whom the church is of no great importance, but every good Churchman knows better. The Christians of the Day of Pentecost had no more intention of founding a church, in our sense of that word, than the disciples of St. Francis. They hoped to convert their brethren in the church to their own faith in Jesus as the Messiah, but this they would do from within, not from without. Whatever their Master said to them in the forty days during which he instructed them in the things pertaining to the Kingdom of God, there is nothing in their behavior to indicate that he said a word about the founding of a Christian Church. They continued in the ancient church till they were driven out. If they had emblazoned a coat-of-arms for the Christian family, they would have drawn a cross upon the shield, but beside the cross, as a further indication of the circumstances of their origin, they would have shown the stones which were hurled at their first martyr, Stephen. They began to be a Christian Church to their amazement, without expectation, without preparation or direction.

What they had was inspiration. St. Paul expresses it when having declared his mind concerning a debated matter (1 Cor. 7 40) he says, This is "after my judgment, and I think also that I have the Spirit of God." The apostles proceeded according to their own judgment, guided by their remembrance of the teaching and example of Jesus. They thought that they had the Spirit of God.

St. Peter, however, in his vision on the housetop, had forgotten the example and teaching of Jesus, and was lacking in the Spirit of God when, being told to disregard the old ceremonial distinction between kinds of food, he said, "Not so, Lord." Jesus had disregarded that distinction. "Not that which goeth into the mouth," he said, "defileth a man." Having so said he departed into

the neighborhood of Tyre and Sidon, for with that declaration his ministry in Galilee was ended. The conservative souls of the scribes and Pharisees were so outraged by this defiance of church tradition that he had to go away to save his life. He had disobeyed not the church only but the Bible (Leviticus 11). From that moment the way was all down-hill, from the heights of popularity to the valley of the shadow of death. But this was so imperfectly understood by St. Peter that the vision on the housetop found him in agreement with the scribes and Pharisees. Even to a voice from heaven, he stoutly replied, "Not so, Lord!"

Accordingly, the apostles proceeded in the ordering of the Christian society, assisted indeed by inspiration, by the example of Jesus and the Spirit of God, but not compelled thereby. For the most part they went right, but sometimes, as in the case of St. Peter, they turned their faces, for the moment, in the wrong direction.

The first thing which they did was to elect an apostle in the place of Judas. If their intention was to restore the number twelve, they were probably thinking in terms of Judaism; they were commending the Christian society to their brethren in the Jewish Church by a loyal recognition of the twelve tribes. This initial act of ecclesiastical organization had no permanent effect. The apostle Matthias had not previously appeared in the records of the Christian discipleship, and he is not heard of afterwards; neither are the Twelve heard of long. It seemed, indeed, for the moment as if the new fraternity was to be controlled by an executive committee of Twelve Apostles, perhaps under the presidency of Peter. But this experiment, if such it was, did not succeed. After a little, the Twelve fall out of sight, and the book called the Acts of the Apostles is found to record the acts of only two apostles — St. Peter, with whom appears St. John as a silent shadow, and St. Paul, who

claimed complete independence of any election or appointment.

The next thing which the Christians did in connection with the ministry was to set apart seven men to care for the poor.

That they did this by the Spirit of God appears in the fact that the division of labor thus effected proved to be for the general good not only immediately but permanently. Whether these seven may properly be called deacons is debated, but it is sufficiently plain that from that day forth the officer who administered the spiritualities had by his side an officer who administered the temporalities. This distinction of duties was not very clearly maintained, even at the beginning. The two deacons about whom we have any account, St. Stephen and St. Philip, distinguished themselves not by their activity in serving tables but by preaching the gospel, that is, by that "ministry of the word" which the apostles had intended to reserve for themselves. But in general the difference of function has continued to this day both within and without the episcopally ordered churches.

It is evident, however, that the work of the Spirit of God in the matter was not to give the apostles an accurate memory of instructions which they had received, but to give them a right judgment in meeting an unexpected need. They were inspired, but not directed. It is inconceivable that our Lord said to the apostles, as he spoke of the things pertaining to the Kingdom of God, "It shall presently come to pass that you will neglect the Grecian widows in the daily ministration; when that happens look out seven men of honest report whom you may appoint over that business." This would have been like encouraging a disease in order to provide an excellent remedy. The apostles ordained the deacons, and in so doing took the first step toward the abiding organization of the Christian Church, under the impulsion of a local

and immediate situation. They said to themselves, Here are new conditions, what now shall we do? And they proceeded to act after their own judgment, thinking also that they had the Spirit of God. In so doing they set a precedent which was followed when to the order of deacons was added the order of bishops, and when upon the order of bishops was superimposed the order of patriarchs or popes. The same precedent was followed when the church in England subtracted the pope, and the church in Germany subtracted the bishops.

This determination of ecclesiastical procedure not by tradition but by the revelation of the Spirit of God in new conditions appears in dramatic form in the apostolic conference in Jerusalem. Paul and Barnabas, returning from their mission in Galatia, report an unprecedented situation. "The Gentiles," they say, "are receptive to the preaching of the gospel, and are applying in great numbers to be admitted to the Christian society. What shall we do?" For up to that moment nobody had become a Christian without having been first a Jew. Such was the necessary order so long as the Christian Church continued to be a Jewish society. One must be a Jew first; as, in order to become a Franciscan or a Dominican one must first be a Catholic Christian. Thus the question of the independence of the Christian Church came up for discussion.

Against such independence stood the fact of the ancient church. There was the Church, established not only in the immemorial history of the people, but in the pages of the Bible. It was there recorded how the church was not only founded but organized by God Himself. He had appointed its sacrifices and services, even in detail; He had blessed its ministry in succession from Aaron; and He had so concerned Himself with the regulation of its life that there were those who said, "Except ye keep the Law of Moses, which God taught him, ye

cannot be saved." All the associations, all the arguments, all the convictions which addressed the consciences of men in the Middle Ages who considered the possibility not of departing from the church but of disobeying the least of its commandments, were arrayed against the men who suggested that Gentiles might be saved without any allegiance to the Aaronic succession or any reference to the book of Leviticus. The idea that the Christian society could be part Jew and part Gentile was to them like the idea that the American Republic could be part free and part slave. It seemed impossible. Indeed, it proved to be impossible; the Gentiles eventually crowded out the Jews. That, however, was not foreseen by the Jewish Christians who met in Conference at Jerusalem. Neither did they foresee with clearness that their action involved the dependence or independence of the Christian Church, for many of them continued to be good Jews, obedient to the Law of Moses, to their life's end. The conservatives, however, suspected such a result sufficiently to make them natural opponents.

On the other hand, in favor of independence was the testimony of Paul and Barnabas, confirmed, in the course of the discussion, by the experience of Peter, to the effect that there was a revelation of the will of God in the present which amended and corrected and superseded the revelations of the will of God in the past. No matter how stoutly one might affirm that salvation and the Law were bound up together, and that grace could not be had outside the church, Paul and Barnabas and Peter declared that they had seen with their own eyes the unmistakable manifestation of the grace of God outside the church. "God," they said, "has borne the Gentiles witness, giving them the Holy Ghost, even as he did unto us, and put no difference between us and them." The result was that the conference at Jerusalem formally

resolved to do that which both the Bible and the Church forbade. Against all texts and canons, the plain word of the Bible and the undoubted custom of the Church, they set the revelation of God in the new conditions, which must be encountered with new methods.

When they put in writing the resolutions which they had adopted, freeing the Gentile members of their fraternity from the yoke of the Mosaic Law, they used a phrase which is the true formula of all independence. "It seemed good," they said, "to the Holy Ghost, and to us." Thus they declared the principle upon which they acted. They set forth the proposition that new times make new duties, and that all allegiance to the past is properly subject to our allegiance to the present. The supreme thing, they said, is not what was done in the old time, even though it be maintained by the Bible and the Church, but what is to be done in this new time in which we live, under these new conditions, in new ways, as it may seem good to the Holy Ghost and to us.

In this radical and revolutionary spirit the Christian Church began as an independent organization. That which was born on the Day of Pentecost was a Christian Society within the Jewish Church; that which was born at this Conference in Jerusalem was the Christian Church itself. It had already been recognized by clear-sighted Jews as a heresy; it was now perceived to be a schism. To such consistent Churchmen, who hold all heresy to be an offence against the truth of God, and all schism an offence against the established order of God, the Pope of Rome himself is no better than a dissenting minister.

From that day forward the most conspicuous fact in the New Testament is the ministry of St. Paul. It was independent not only of the Law of Moses but of the authority of the apostles. St. Paul was "an apostle, not of men, neither by man, but by Jesus Christ and God the Father." His call came straight from the sky,

and he had no other ordination than that which such a call conferred. The matter was much debated, and he was careful to make his position plain. The question was as to the necessity of apostolic ordination. The conservative brethren informed the Galatians that Paul had no ecclesiastical standing, because he had not been appointed by the apostles; he was not in the apostolic succession. Paul, writing to the Galatians, not only confesses the fact but glories in it. His ministry is dependent on no man. When I was converted, he says, and commissioned by the Lord Jesus Christ, I went on to Damascus, and thence to Arabia. I conferred not with flesh and blood. It was three years before I even saw an apostle. Then I spent only fifteen days in Jerusalem, and met Peter and James, the Lord's brother, and thereafter went immediately into a ministry of a dozen years in Syria and Cilicia, and was unknown by face unto the churches of Judea. On my return I visited Jerusalem and conversed with "those who seemed to be somewhat," and those who seemed to be somewhat, as for example, James, Peter, and John, added nothing to me. They contributed neither instruction nor authority, only they gave to Barnabas and me the right hands of fellowship and said, Go on with your good work among the Gentiles.

Many of the conservative brethren disapproved of this arrangement, and did their best to hinder and discredit the ministry of St. Paul. The true mind of the church, however, found expression in the giving of the right hand of fellowship, which meant that difference need not result in division. Thenceforth the Jewish part of the church, continuing in the old ways, under the leadership of apostles, and the Gentile part of the church, departing from the old ways and going in new directions, under the leadership of men who though they were called apostles were independent of the Twelve, lived side by side, with

occasional disagreements and misunderstandings but as brethren in one united church. It was a brotherly covenant between those who stood, in later phrase, for the old learning and those who stood for the new; as we should say, between Catholics and Protestants, between those whose ministry derived its authority from the apostles, and those whose ministry derived its authority from the immediate call of God.

The references to the ministry in the New Testament confirm the impression that organization is still subject to experiment; they are in accord with the theory that the common expectation of the speedy end of the world made all such matters unimportant. So long as that expectation continued, there was no thought of laying permanent foundations or of making arrangements for a long future. It was sufficient to meet the present local need. St. Paul in Galatia, for the confirming of the souls of the disciples, ordains them elders in every church. And so elsewhere. Accordingly these churches knew two kinds of ministers, local and general. The local ministers were the elders and deacons; the general minister was the missionary by whom they had been converted. The local ministry was relatively insignificant. St. Paul writes to the Romans, to the Corinthians, to the Galatians, to the Ephesians, to the Colossians, addressing himself directly to the brethren, making no mention of the elders. Writing to the Philippians, he invokes the grace of God upon all the saints, and also upon the bishops and deacons. But neither bishops nor deacons appear under these titles in the list which he gives in his First Epistle to the Corinthians (12 28). "God," he says, "hath set some in the church, first apostles, secondarily prophets, thirdly teachers, after that miracles, then gifts of healing, helps, governments, diversities of tongues." The local officers — the deacons, and the elders, also called presbyters, also called bishops

— appear here only towards the end in the terms “helps” and “governments.” In the list in Ephesians (4 11) — “he gave some, apostles; and some, prophets; and some, evangelists; and some, pastors and teachers”—they do not appear at all, unless as “pastors.” The Christians are so few that the missionary goes about on circuit among his missions, performing all the necessary spiritual offices, and needing little assistance from those whom he has appointed over the local communities.

These various records of the proceedings of the apostolic church show plainly that the ordering of the ministry was determined by experiment. The primitive Christians had no directions derived in detail from Jesus Christ; what they had was inspiration, by which we mean that guidance into truth and right which God gave then, and still gives, to those who honestly desire to do His will. The inference is that if experiment was a valid process in the first century, it was valid in the sixteenth, and is still valid in the twentieth. No ordering of the ministry is sacrosanct; neither the papal order, with its many ministers; nor the episcopal order, with its three kinds—bishops, priests, and deacons; nor the presbyterian order, with presbyters and deacons; nor the congregational order, with independent presbyters; nor the Quaker order, with no minister at all. These all arose from endeavors to meet what seemed an imperative need, following the precedent of the invention of deacons by the Twelve. Some of the experiments succeeded well, some not so well; thereby was manifested the divine approval or disapproval. Sometimes an experiment succeeded for a time, and was then thought to be a mistake, a hindrance rather than a help; so some felt, wisely or unwisely, about the papacy or episcopacy. The resulting change has its precedent in the tentative conditions out of which every detail of the ministry came. It is to be tested not by its conformity to any

divine direction, but by such conformity alike to the will of God and to the needs of man as appears in its spiritual success.

II

The hesitation of good Churchmen to acknowledge the validity of non-Episcopal orders is due not only to a confusion of inspiration with direction, but also to a confusion of validity with regularity.

As the church passed out of the first century into the second, several conditions emphasized the importance of regularity. Naturally and inevitably the first fine freedom of enthusiasm sobered into organization. It was perceived that the end of the world was not so near as had been believed, and it was necessary to make arrangements for the future. A continual increase in the number of Christians called for a conduct of services and a distribution of ministerial duties such as had not been needed in the little domestic groups which constituted so many of the early churches.

Accordingly a change took place in the position of the local ministry. The three orders to which St. Paul had given prominence — “first apostles, secondarily prophets; thirdly teachers” — had been for the most part itinerant, a ministry at large. The subsequent association of teachers with pastors — “pastors and teachers” — may mean that these were the first to settle and become a part of the local organization. There were also local prophets, as appears in the liturgical confusion at Corinth; but in the second-century document called *The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* the prophets are wandering preachers who are beginning to be in disfavor. Some of them have so imposed upon the hospitable brethren that it has become necessary to rule that no prophet shall remain in a parish more than one day, or

two at the most; "If he remain three days, he is a false prophet." Gradually, in spite of efforts to retain and revive it, the order of prophets ceased. As for the apostles, though the title had been extended beyond the first Twelve, they came to the end of their days and died. Thus the local ministers came into a place of new importance.

The apostles and prophets and teachers had been charged with the ministry of religion, in distinction from the presbyters (or bishops) and deacons who had been charged with the ministry of discipline and the care of the poor. That the distinctions were loosely drawn appears, indeed, in the case of Stephen, who went beyond his duties as a deacon to act as prophet or teacher, and in the case of Philip, who exceeded his duties as a deacon to carry the gospel into Samaria like an apostle; every man did what he could, without any strict regard to official limitations. In general, however, the presbyters ruled and the deacons served; having, as we should say, lay rather than clerical duties. They were wardens and vestrymen rather than what we call ministers; thus following the pattern of the synagogue, in which so many of them had been brought up, whose officers were all laymen. The synagogue differed from the temple both in the character of its services and in the ecclesiastical standing of its officers, as the Young Men's Christian Association differs from the Church.

Of course, the presbyters and deacons were engaged in the extension of the Christian religion. Everything that they did was religious, and was in the spirit of the fervent enthusiasm of the time. Whatever their office, they praised and prayed and preached as they were able. But so did all the congregation. The presbyters and deacons baptized, but any Christian might baptize. If they had any special places at the Lord's Supper, the fact does not appear in St. Paul's admonitions to the Corin-

thians, which are addressed to the congregation without reference to the clergy. The Corinthian services, as he describes them, were curiously congregational and non-clerical. Everybody had a psalm, a doctrine, a tongue, a revelation, or an interpretation. The best that could be done in the way of order was to suggest that not more than three members of the congregation should speak at the same time. The local parish was like a frontier mission of zealous people, carrying on their own services, managing their affairs by an executive committee (the presbyters and deacons) and visited at long intervals by a minister (an apostle or a prophet) when one was able in his wide circuit to get to that neighborhood. When the ministry at large ceased and the prophets and apostles came no more, it was necessary to make new arrangements.

One of these new arrangements appears in the office of the presbyter-president. The presbyter in some places had been appointed by apostles, as St. Paul ordained elders in Galatia. More often, the apostles being few, and the churches many and widely scattered, the presbyters were chosen by the congregation, as in Rome, where there were elders before the visit of any apostle. At first for administrative convenience, then for religious direction and order, one presbyter presided over the group of presbyters. Justin Martyr calls him the president. His position, as he appears in the Apology, at the head of the table at the Lord's Supper, suggests one of the ways in which he was naturally distinguished from his brethren. In the nature of things, the Corinthian disorder at the services and the sacraments became intolerable. It was stopped by the election of a presiding officer. The ceasing of the visits of apostles, and the consequent independence of the local parish, increased his responsibilities. The nature of his office was indicated by his title; he was called bishop.

The presbyters had been called bishops from the beginning. St. Paul having summoned the presbyters of Ephesus (the word in our translation is "elders") exhorts them to take heed to themselves and to the flock over which the Holy Ghost has made them bishops (ἐπισκόπους, "overseers"). As the presbyter-president came to be distinguished from his brethren, the title of bishop was naturally appropriated to him, signifying his function of oversight. Naturally also, by processes of human nature rather than by any formal action, his influence and authority increased. He was the head of the local church.

It is in this capacity, as a parochial bishop, that he appears in the letters of Ignatius. Ignatius, bishop of Antioch, being carried across Asia Minor on his way to martyrdom at Rome, writes letters of greeting and farewell and counsel to the churches of the chief cities. He admonishes them concerning the evil of division, against which he exalts the office of the bishop. "Do nothing," he says, "apart from the bishop." "He who does anything apart from the bishop serves the devil." Obedience to the bishop is obedience to God. "We ought to regard the bishop as the Lord himself." "Reverence the bishop as Jesus Christ, and the presbyters as the assembly of the apostles."

This teaching, as Jerome afterwards reminded the bishops of his time, had no standing in the word of the Lord or of the apostles. "With the ancients," he says, "presbyters were the same as bishops; but gradually all the responsibility was deferred to a single person, that the thickets of heresy might be rooted out. Therefore as presbyters know that by the custom of the church they are subject to him who shall have been set over them, so let bishops be also aware that they are superior to presbyters more owing to custom than to any actual ordinance of the Lord." Indeed, the Ignatian epistles

themselves show plainly that the interest of Ignatius was not so much in the doctrine of the ministry as in the peace of the local parish. In the peril of heresy and schism he found safety in allegiance to the bishop. But the bishop is what we should call the rector of the parish. He is the minister of the local church. He is a parochial bishop; his diocese is the city where he lives. He differs little from the pastors of Puritan churches in colonial New England. Samuel Spaulding of Northampton, whom the discerning Indians called "the Englishmen's God," was a parochial bishop. So were the divines whom Cotton Mather celebrated in the *Magnalia*.

Even so, there were those who protested against any exaltation of one brother above another. The Montanists objected to the rubrics which gave to a master of the assembly the right to limit the primitive liberty of speech and action in the conduct of the service. They claimed the right to interrupt. They wished to speak with tongues and prophesy, and to behave themselves as their brethren had done in the good old times in Corinth. As for the new clerical distinctions by which they found themselves restrained, they resented and refused them. The novel arrangements of precedence and function, according to which one was a bishop and others were presbyters and deacons, they opposed. They recognized no distinctions between ministers and laymen. "Are not we laymen priests," they said, "as well as you?"

In spite of these objections the evolution of the ministry continued. As the Christians increased in number, and there were churches not only in the cities but in the neighboring towns, the parish with the bishop for its rector and the presbyters for curates no longer met the needs of the situation. The presbyters were sent out from the cities to be the ministers of town parishes. Under these circumstances, various rights and duties

which had previously belonged to the bishop alone were now given to the presbyters. At the same time certain exceptions were made whereby the presbyters were kept in dependence. They were prevented from becoming parochial bishops. One of the privileges thus withheld was the laying on of hands in confirmation. This completion of the service of baptism was reserved for the bishop. Another withheld privilege was the laying on of hands in ordination. A bishop indeed might not admit to the order of presbyters without the coöperation of the presbyters; they must lay on their hands with his; but no assembly of presbyters might ordain without the bishop. Thus a part was reserved for the bishop in the office of baptism, whereby admission was given to the membership of the church, and in the office of ordination, whereby admission was given to the church's ministry. Along with these reservations went a natural oversight of the dependent presbyters and their parishes. The effect was to widen the bishop's responsibility and authority. He became a diocesan bishop.

Meanwhile the importance of the bishop was magnified by the use which was made of him in the argument against heresy. The Gnostics, who held that matter is essentially evil, and who therefore denied that God made the world (how could the good God make the bad world?) and denied also that God became incarnate (how could God take our evil flesh upon him?), claimed that their heresy was the true doctrine of the apostles. They based their claim upon a tradition which, they said, had been handed down from apostolic times. They declared that the apostles had taught the Gnostic creed to such as were able to receive it, and that those favored disciples (Gnostics, men who know) had instructed their disciples, and so on.

For such assertions Irenæus (c. 150 A.D.) found a determining test in the apostolic succession. The true

doctrine of the apostles, he maintained, is that which the apostles themselves committed to those whom they put in charge of the churches which they founded. This doctrine these men handed down in their turn to their successors. They can tell us whether or not the apostles taught this or that. Here, let us say, is Valentinus teaching Gnosticism in Rome, and claiming to have a secret tradition derived from the apostles. We will confute Valentinus by referring the matter to the bishop. Tell us, Bishop Pius, how this doctrine agrees with the faith as it was communicated to you by your predecessor Hyginus, who received it from his predecessor Telesphorus, and he from Sixtus, and he from Alexander, and so from Evaristus, and Clement II, and Anacletus, and Linus, and Clement I (many names for a hundred years, but most of them martyred), and Clement from St. Peter and St. Paul. Pius answers thus and so, and we perceive that the claim of Valentinus will not stand. The decisive evidence is that of the successor of the apostles.

The effect of this method with heretics was to magnify the office of the bishop. He was thus related not only to the administration of his diocese but to the Christian faith. It was highly important that his election and consecration should be so carefully ordered as to make his succession from the apostles plain. His episcopal genealogy must be without interruption or defect. To guard against the possibility of failure in a single line every bishop must have the hands of at least three bishops laid upon him, thus making the succession not a line but a network of lines. This arrangement discredited any bishop who had come into his place some other way. The disaffection which had led brethren to separate from the bishop of the apostolic succession and appoint another might have been so justifiable that all the right and all the truth were on their side, and the new bishop who lacked the sanction of the succession might have all the other

virtues of the blessed saints, nevertheless he was incapacitated for the necessary work of bearing witness to ancient custom against modern innovation, and to apostolic truth against the falsehoods of heresy. He was denied a place among the custodians of the faith.

The Gnostic heresy went where all the good heresies go: what was true in it became orthodoxy, and what was false was more or less forgotten. The books of the New Testament took the place of the tradition of the apostolically descended bishops. There was no further use for the apostolic succession in the transmission of truth. It was continued in service for the transmission of grace.

The Christians had long differed from their neighbors in the directness of their approach to God. In the Greek and Roman world in which they lived religion was defined in terms of priesthood, and this was also the language of the sacred books which Christianity had inherited from Judaism. Between man and God, offering the prayers and praises of the people and bringing down pardon and help and blessing from on high, were mediating priests. The synagogue, maintained without the presence of priests, had taught a new way in religion, and upon this the Christians had so far improved that they were commonly accused of atheism. They differed from all their neighbors not only in having no statues or symbols of the gods, but in having no altars or sacrifices. As for priests, they were all priests, they said.

It is very difficult, however, to resist the influence of a general idea. Naturally, perhaps inevitably, the Christians used the metaphors of sacerdotal religion. Even in the New Testament, the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews deals with Judaism not like St. Paul, in the spirit of uncompromising contention, but in the spirit of conciliation: Christianity is not so much an opponent of Judaism as a fulfilment, a substantial fulfilment of old prophecies and symbols and sacrifices. We too, he says,

have an altar. Even Tertullian, asserting the Montanist position that there is no essential difference between the clergy and the laity, uses the title "priests": Are not we laymen priests as well as you? Thus far, there is no sacerdotal meaning. In the Christian religion there is only one priest — our great High Priest who has ascended into the heavens — by whom every humblest layman may come boldly unto the throne of grace and obtain mercy and find grace to help in time of need. Gradually, however, the sacerdotal words are applied to the work of the ministry. In the middle of the third century, in the time of Cyprian, although the presbyters are not yet called priests, that title is given to the bishop. He stands at the Lord's Table as at an altar, and offers not only the sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving but, as Cyprian says, the sacrifice of the Lord's Passion.

The function of a priesthood, the purpose of a sacrifice, is to gain the grace of God. The priest is endeavoring to secure for us the favor of God. He is doing for us that which we cannot do for ourselves. He is an essential factor in our salvation. But he must be a true priest, duly qualified to mediate between us and God. As schisms increase, and rival claims are made by bishops against bishops and presbyters against presbyters, and now this company and now that declares itself the true church, where shall we find solution and assurance? Cyprian said, In the apostolic succession.

Up to that time the man who was in the succession might say to his dissenting neighbor, Your ministry is irregular. Cyprian taught him to say, Your ministry is invalid.

The test of regularity is accordance with the laws and customs. A regular ministry is that which has proceeded along the accepted lines of development, being loyal to the presbyter-president, and then to the parochial bishop, and then to the diocesan bishop, as these officers appear

and prevail. When presently, against the protests of Cyprian, the diocesan bishops are subordinated to a patriarchal bishop or pope, the regular ministry conforms to this development.

An irregular ministry proceeds along a line of its own. In the time of the presbyter-president it refuses to acknowledge a distinction between the clergy and the laity. In the time of the parochial bishop, and then of the diocesan bishop, it reserves the right to disagree with him. It stands for free thinking and free speaking, and for the independence of the local congregation. It maintains the religion of the spirit over against the religion of authority.

Such an irregular ministry is reprobated by ecclesiastics. The effect of it has often been to weaken the church in its contention with the evil of the world. It has been the resort of narrow individualists, of eccentrics, of rebellious, factious, and sectarian spirits, impatient of the restraints of order. On the other hand, it has often raised a needed protest against superstition, ambition, and despotism in the church. Thus it corresponds with revolution in the state: sometimes unwise and productive only of disorder and reaction; sometimes unsuccessful though provoked by intolerable wrongs; but sometimes a means of setting forward the progress of liberty and justice. From the point of view of the British monarchy, especially as it is represented by the doctrine of the divine right of kings, the American Republic is an irregular government. So is the method of ordination irregular "as practised in Scotland, at Geneva, and among dissenters in England and in the churches in this country." So also is Episcopal ordination irregular from the point of view of the patriarchal bishop of the West, the Pope of Rome.

Cyprian took the exceedingly important step of declaring that these irregular ministries are invalid. They are

not only disturbing and inconvenient and a hindrance to ecclesiastical administration, but they have no spiritual standing. They are null and void. He declared that outside the church there is no salvation. "He cannot have God for his Father who has not the church for his mother. If he could escape who was outside the ark, he too will escape who is abroad and outside the church." Thus he claimed for the church a monopoly of grace. This he did not as a new revealer of the mind of God but rather as the spokesman of the contemporary situation. As a Roman lawyer, acquainted with the processes of Roman order and Roman methods of transmitting power, this, he felt, was what the Christian society needed. This, he said, is how God deals with man.

Thus Cyprian introduced a new definition of the church. Nothing so revolutionary had been proposed since the original declaration of independence in the conference at Jerusalem. Nothing so revolutionary was said again till the Reformation. Cyprian's doctrine of grace determined the character of that aspect of Christianity which is called Catholicism, as Luther's doctrine of grace determined the character of that aspect of Christianity which is called Protestantism. Cyprian and Luther agreed that divine grace is essential to salvation. Luther said that it can be had by the direct appeal of any man to God. Cyprian said that it can be had only in the church, and he defined the church as identified and bounded by the apostolic succession.

The difficulty with Cyprian's doctrine is that it has no standing in revelation, in reason, or in experience. It is not derived from the New Testament, which is a protest against a monopoly of grace. It is not supported by reason, which finds nothing but futility in the claim of any organization to limit by its by-laws the dispensation of the grace of God. It is not supported by experience,

which testifies, on the contrary, that there is at least as much of the grace of God outside the apostolic succession as there is inside. The test of regularity is the canon law, but the test of validity is the blessing of God. It is in vain that irregular ministries are pronounced invalid; for they who exercise them and they who benefit by them know by their own experience that they have the divine acceptance and benediction.

Happily, the Church of England has made no such pronouncement. There are individual Churchmen, indeed, who have maintained in sermons and in printed books that outside of the apostolic succession there is no assurance of salvation. But there are individual Churchmen who have maintained other impossible doctrines. Statements such as these are of the nature of private opinion. The official statement is in the preface to the Ordinal: "It is evident unto all men diligently reading Holy Scripture and ancient Authors, that from the Apostles' time there have been three Orders of Ministers in Christ's Church — Bishops, Priests, and Deacons. Which Offices were evermore had in such reverend estimation that no man might presume to execute any of them except he were first called, tried, examined, and known to have such qualities as are requisite for the same; and also by public Prayer, with Imposition of Hands, were approved and admitted thereunto by lawful Authority. And therefore, to the intent that these Orders may be continued, and reverently used and esteemed in this Church, no man shall be accounted or taken to be a lawful Bishop, Priest, or Deacon in this Church, or suffered to execute said Functions, except he be called, tried, examined, and admitted thereto, according to the Form hereafter following, or hath had Episcopal Consecration or Ordination." The application of this statement is indicated in the phrase "this Church." Nothing is said concerning the ministry of other churches.

The Twenty-third Article of Religion, entitled "Of Ministry in the Congregation," reads: "It is not lawful for any man to take upon him the office of public preaching, or ministering the Sacraments in the Congregation, before he be lawfully called, and sent to execute the same. And those we ought to judge lawfully called and sent, which be chosen and called to this work by men who have public authority given unto them in the Congregation to call and send Ministers into the Lord's vineyard." These sentences are plainly Protestant. Any Methodist or Presbyterian or Congregationalist would say the same. The intention is to secure a selected and instructed ministry and to maintain order.

Except in the invocation of one prayer, in the American office of Institution of Ministers, the apostolic succession is not mentioned in the formularies of the church. The threefold ministry, beginning in primitive Christianity and continued through the subsequent centuries by Episcopal ordination, is held in reverent esteem, and is required in the Episcopal Church, in England and in America. It is the standard of regularity in "this Church." But in the preface to the American revision of the Book of Common Prayer, where it is said that by the gaining of our political independence "the different denominations of Christians in these States were left at full and equal liberty to model and organize their respective Churches, and forms of worship, and discipline, in such manner as they might judge most convenient for their future prosperity," there is no suggestion that by the exercise of this liberty these Christians may be imperiling the salvation of their souls.

The difference between Episcopal and non-Episcopal ordination is not in the matter of validity; for the test of validity is acceptance with God, who blesses these ministries alike, and gives His grace as abundantly by the sacraments of the one as by the sacraments of the

other. The difference is in the matter of regularity, according to the standards of the canon law. It is a minor difference, but yet important because it has to do with the better union of the churches.

The historic episcopate connects the Christians who possess it with the ancient churches of the East and of the West, and is thereby a factor in that larger unity which, however remote from present realization, ought not to be left out of our ideals; there can be no reunion of Christendom without it.

It has also a nearer value by its relation to the contemporary problem of ecclesiastical division. To this difficulty it brings a solution. There are differences within the Episcopal Church which are nearly as great as the differences without. High Churchmen, Low Churchmen, and Broad Churchmen are almost as diverse the one from the other as Roman Catholics, Methodists, and Congregationalists. They are held together by their common allegiance to their father in God, the bishop. It is like the inclusion of various tastes, temperaments, manners, and convictions in a family. It is proved by actual experience that most of the types of religion which now separate people into divided denominations can live together in a reasonable measure of peace and maintain the principles for which they stand, under the conditions of a constitutional episcopacy. It is as democratic and as comprehensive as the administration of the United States.

Meanwhile, as regards those who prefer some other way, we may well agree with Judge Dudley, that "the great Head of the Church, by his blessed Spirit, hath owned, sanctified, and blessed them." Dudley believed that God would "continue to do so to the end of the World"; but we may hope that our divisions will not last that long.

THE FIRST EUROPEAN CONGRESS¹

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Most current references to European Congresses prior to the one now sitting in Paris go no farther back than the Congress of Vienna in 1815. These references generally suggest that, whatever may have been done at Vienna, this we do not propose to do at Paris. The implication is that the European world has been running on the wrong track, and that now it is the mission of somebody to set it right and start it anew on wiser and safer lines. Students of history, however, know that Vienna and Paris mark only two stages in a long succession of efforts to bring the peoples of Europe into some kind of harmonious working together for common ends. The terminology of these attempts, the immediate interests involved, vary greatly, so greatly that the casual reader of history easily fails to recognize the community of purpose; but to one who has in mind the fundamental principle of historic continuity the chain of ideas is fairly distinct and complete.

Not to push that principle too far, I am asking your attention to certain aspects of what may fairly be called the First European Congress. You will not find it under that name in historical manuals. There it figures as the Council of Constance, and is commonly treated as a religious conference, held in an obscure sub-alpine German town in the early years of the fifteenth century precisely corresponding to the dates of the recent European war, 1414 to 1418. Its character as a religious assembly,

¹An Address delivered before the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, March 12, 1919.

however, was completely overshadowed by its constantly increasing importance as a forum for the discussion of every variety of European interest. And this universal character was not accidental. It had been prepared for by a long series of preliminary discussions covering at least a full generation and pointing with ever increasing distinctness towards a General Council for their adequate publicity and their possible solution.

The immediate incitement to these preliminary debates was the occurrence in the year 1378 of the so-called, and well-called, Great Schism in the administration of the Church of the West. For seventy years previous to that date the head of the Roman Catholic world had been a Frenchman and had lived in France, under the protection of the French government and generally in harmony with its political policies. This French residence, with its diversion of the papal interests from Italy and Germany, and with its obvious suggestion of enmity to England — for this is the period of the Hundred Years' War between England and France — had brought out a continuous line of protest, and this protest culminated in the year 1376 in the return of Pope Gregory XI to Rome and his death there in 1378.

The election which followed, the first in Rome for two generations, resulted in the choice of an Italian, who called himself Urban VI, and whose election was, as we should say, "made unanimous" by the recognition of the individual cardinals, the constitutional electoral body of the Church. Within a few weeks, however, the French elements in the cardinalate began to discover certain irregularities in the election of Pope Urban, and to develop certain scruples of conscience in regard to their own action. They seceded from the Curia and proceeded to elect a pope of their own, a French nobleman, Clement VII, a relative of the French king, who was undoubtedly privy to the proceedings.

The casual story of the Schism represents these two reverend prelates, sitting on their respective thrones, making faces and hurling anathemas at each other to the grief and scandal of Christendom; but with all that we are not concerned. What interests us is the storm of discussion that almost instantly broke forth as to the means by which this obvious scandal could be healed. Politically Europe divided pretty nearly on the lines already indicated by previous antagonisms. The Latin peoples, plus Scotland — which may fairly be described as the Ireland of that day — stood by the French pope. The Germanic nations, including England and northern Italy, supported the “Roman” claim. A flood of pamphlets, of which the University of Paris was the most prolific source, examined the question in all conceivable lights and suggested a great variety of remedies.

At first the discussion turned naturally upon the legal aspects of the case. “Who began it?” “Whose fault was it?” “Which election was the legitimate one?” These were the questions on which the greatest jurists of the day displayed their learning, their ingenuity, and also, it must be confessed, their party allegiances. Precisely the same thing happened in the recent war. We began with furious debates about the “guilt” of Germany, and Germany retorted with pious insistence upon the “threatening attitude” of France. But very soon it became evident then as now that no progress could be made by this method. The Schism was there; the thing to do was to get rid of it. But how? Each pope declared himself to be the divinely selected successor to St. Peter and so bound to carry out the divine purpose by holding on. All sorts of devices were suggested; we are concerned with only one. From a very early stage all signs began to point towards the holding of a General Council.

But what was a Council? and how could it be called? Obviously neither pope would call a Council to depose

himself; and yet all formal orthodox definitions of a Council included the pope as an integral part of it, and it was universally understood that only a pope could call a valid Council. An assembly summoned in any other way might be ever so imposing in numbers or in weight, but a Council it would not be. Fortunately the way to a solution of this deadlock had been prepared by a profound transformation in European methods of thought that had slowly been making its way for two generations. I refer, of course, to the Nominalistic philosophy, which under the lead of the Englishman, William Ockham (d. 1349), was gradually replacing the mediæval, realistic method of looking at the world of nature and of human relations. In consequence of this transformation men were becoming accustomed to the amazing proposition that the State and the Church alike consisted of the individuals who composed them, and that the law, alike of State and of Church, was to be found in the will of the whole body of the citizens of each.

Here was the clue to the solution of the problem of the Schism. The wrangling of the parties went on. Schismatic popes died and new ones were elected by their respective partisans. But meanwhile there had been growing in both camps a new sense of the supreme importance of unity. In 1408 a group of cardinals from both sides united in a call for a Council at Pisa in Italy. Both popes anathematized everybody concerned, but the thing went on. The call was answered. A considerable assembly met at Pisa, declared both popes deposed and supervised the election in due canonical form of a new pope. The actual election was conducted by the "union" cardinals, but the Council as such validated the election. Of course neither of the rival popes accepted the result. There was now a triple schism. On the death of the "Pisan" pope within a year, a successor to him was chosen by "his" cardinals, and the Schism was still on.

The most important act of the Council at Pisa was its adjournment to a date. That act expressed the feeling of Europe that the Council ought to be a continuing body, the real representative of European opinion in religious matters, and every one knew that there was no subject in the range of European politics that might not in some way be included under the head of religion. It was in pursuance of this adjournment that the Council of Constance, after long negotiations, came together. The choice of the place was the first victory for the party which we may henceforth describe as the party of Reform. Hitherto all councils since the establishment of the papal system had been held either in Italy or, as happened on one or two occasions, in some place under papal control. Now the emperor Sigismund, making himself the spokesman for the universal sentiment of western Christendom, insisted that the forthcoming council should be held outside of Italy, and the "Pisan" pope, John XXIII, driven to extremities by the pressure of Italian politics, was forced to consent. Constance was an imperial German city, accessible from all parts of Europe, in the midst of a fertile country well furnished with roads and waterways for the transport of provisions in large quantities. The emperor made himself the protector of the Council, and the city magistracy undertook the supervision of law and order.

The call to Constance came from Pope John XXIII, not of his own volition but to save his face and to prevent the still greater evil of a call by the emperor or some other power. John's personal character does not greatly concern us. If we could believe one half of the indictment found against him at Constance, we should have to think of him as a blackguard of the deepest dye. A south-Italian, educated as a soldier and a pirate, he had turned to the more profitable trade of a churchman and had risen by all the arts of a successful politician to the

cardinalate and so to the summit of earthly greatness. As pope he had called out endless antagonisms, but might perhaps have overcome these, had it not been for that awakening of the European conscience which had already once expressed itself at Pisa. To this imperative demand even a John XXIII had to bow. When he could no longer resist, he called the Council and came personally to attend it. He came expecting to be its presiding genius; he found himself a criminal before its tribunal, and, like a more recent partner in the divine administration of the universe, he took to his heels at the critical moment, deserted his party and his cause and left the field open for the free action of the great conference he had defied.

As regards the composition of the Council, we are interested especially in the representation of the lay elements of the population. In all the preliminary discussions especial emphasis had been placed upon this point: that any true expression of the mind of Christendom could come only from the free utterance of all persons competent to speak and not merely from the hitherto dominant clerical order. The effect of this emphasis had been seen at Pisa, but now at Constance it was overwhelming. In practice the representation of the laity took two main forms — the representation of governments and the representation of learning. It is, of course, true that learning was still largely in the hands of clerical persons, but the important thing here is that such persons appeared at Constance rather in their scholarly than in their clerical character.

The Constance chronicler, Ulrich Richental, to whom we are indebted for most of our statistical information on this matter, gives at the close of his narrative a summary of the persons who at one time or another took part in the work of the Council. Making all allowance for the uncertainty of numbers, we gain a fair

notion of the proportion of the lay interests. Besides the emperor and empress there were, says the chronicler, 39 dukes, 32 counts and gentlemen of princely rank, 141 counts, 71 *Freiherrn*, more than 1,500 knights, more than 20,000 (*sic*) squires. More than 83 kings from Asia, Africa, and Europe sent ambassadors. There were 472 embassies from imperial cities and 352 from provincial cities. The universities were represented by 37 persons with 2,000 attendants. There were 217 Doctors of Theology with 2,600 persons, 361 Doctors of Laws with 1,260, 1,400 Masters of Arts and Licentiates with 3,000. A later hand has written into the manuscript a total of more than seventy-two thousand persons who came and went during the four years.²

The objects of the Council of Constance are readily defined as three in number. First, the restoration of unity to the Church; second, the purification of Europe from the effects of the Wyclifite heresies which, continued by the Hussite party in Bohemia, had attacked the very foundations of the mediæval papal system; third, "Reform of the Church in Head and Members." Unity, Orthodoxy, and Administrative Reform — an apparently simple program, as to which, "in principle" as we say nowadays, there was no difference of opinion. Everybody wanted unity, nobody wanted heresy, and nobody would have dared to say that he was not interested in reform. It is always easy to agree on fine principles; it is never easy to determine how those principles shall be applied to the hard facts of human experience. At this moment the whole world is discussing whether we shall first set up a League of Nations and then through this League as an instrument proceed to adjust the clamorous demands of peoples who have suffered and paid the price of war, or whether we shall first try to adjust these claims,

² Richental's figures are notoriously untrustworthy. It would probably be safe to divide his totals here by at least two, and in some cases ten would be the safer divisor.

and then form our League of Nations to enforce them. Precisely the same type of questions appeared at Constance and occupied the earnest attention of the best minds in Europe continuously for more than three years.

Those who desired above all things to save the wreckage of the ancient system insisted that the first duty of the Council was to secure a single pope, who then, in virtue of his divine commission, would proceed to right all wrongs and make schemes of reform unnecessary. The reformers, on the other hand, demanded that the Council should first commit itself definitely to certain specific measures of reform and then proceed to choose a pope to carry them out. The debates on this problem form the chief historic interest of the Council, for it is in these that the real question at issue—the nature of the Church as a human organization and its relation to the civil powers—comes to its fullest and freest expression.

Meanwhile the third problem—the purification of Europe from the stain of heresy—came to the help of the other two. This was a reforming council; but it would have been a fatal blunder at this point if it had seemed in any way to identify itself with those movements for reform which rested upon doctrinal interpretations of Christianity. To have shown tenderness toward the doctrines of Wycliffe or Hus would have been as rash as it would be for the present Peace Conference to negotiate with the rampant Bolshevism of the moment. The comparison is in every way justified. It was a fortunate incident that John Hus, already a popular leader of religious and national thought in Bohemia, accepted the invitation of the Council to come to Constance and defend his opinions. Those who have followed the story of the Czecho-Slovak movement of the last two years will have noticed that its leaders point continually back

to John Hus as their spiritual ancestor. He represented the same hostility to German influence, German Kultur, and German political control which have inspired the patriots of Bohemia in these modern days. He came to Constance trusting in the safe-conduct of the German emperor Sigismund, a shifty politician who would never let a scrap of paper stand between him and the welfare of Christian Europe. Hus was handed over to the clerical tribunal, which passed him back to the secular arm, which fulfilled its undoubted duty by burning him alive. The emperor and the Council had vindicated their orthodoxy in the eyes of Europe and could go on with clean hands to the holy work of union and reform.

The reform propositions at Constance dealt mainly with two aspects of the wide-spread corruption which all friends of religion acknowledged and deplored. One of these was a moral, the other a financial evil. The moral indictment touched the personal quality of the clergy both secular and regular. Of course no one undertook to defend, even by scholastic casuistry, obvious violations of morality, but the Church, in its nervous anxiety to protect the sanctity and validity of those sacramental acts on which the whole framework of society was based, had come to minimize the importance by comparison of the element of personal character. The sacraments of an evil priest, so long as he remained a priest, were equally valid with those of the purest. So important was this distinction felt to be that even in the Augsburg Confession of 1530, the Constitution of Lutheran Protestantism, it was retained and defended. The moral delinquencies of laymen were atoned for by an easy system of clerical book-keeping, which was calling forth the denunciations of clear-sighted and plain-speaking men everywhere. Against these dangers there were but two possible defences — the local episcopal discipline, and the supervision of the national governments, and these

were precisely the two forces which the exaggerated papalism of the fourteenth century had done its best to break down.

To strengthen these two forces — national government and the local episcopate — was to be the most important work at Constance. Essentially it was but one endeavor, for during the whole process of its wonderful expansion the Papacy had found the national state and the national churches its most determined, persistent, and powerful opponents. On the whole, it had so far got the better of them, but now, during the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, a resistless tide of nationalist sentiment had risen, never to fall again. England and France were fighting it out in the Hundred Years' War. Germany, in her Great Charter, the Golden Bull of 1356, had declared herself independent of foreign control. Italy, still divided into warring provinces, was intensely conscious of a national spirit as against all foreign rivalry, and the same was increasingly true of Spain.

The reflection of all this at Constance is seen notably in the forms of procedure decided upon after some active discussion. It had been assumed that the decisions of the Council would be reached by majority voting, and in anticipation of this, Pope John XXIII had come to Constance with a following of perhaps six hundred men. The utter collapse of his cause in the early days of 1415 made it quite certain that the preponderance of Italian influence was once for all broken. The nations as such were to be henceforth the units both of debate and of action. Five great powers — England, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain — agreed upon a scheme which marks a turning-point in the politics of Europe. It was not called a League of Nations, but, partly because it was not so called, it proved to be only so much the more effective in producing common action and a reasonable degree of liberal international sentiment.

The model for the constitution of the several "Nations" at the Council was found in the existing arrangements of the most important universities, such for instance as Paris and Bologna. The "*Universitas*," that is to say, the whole body of teachers and taught, was divided for purposes of administration into groups designated by national terms, but including members of many other nationalities as well. Within these groups were decided the most weighty matters of university policy and discipline. It is probable that the very important part played at Constance by university teachers led to the adoption of this scheme for the Council. Each nation had its own assembly-room where its deputies met regularly to discuss the questions laid before it by a general committee of the Council. Besides these meetings of the several nations there were gatherings of all the national deputies for further discussion. The decisions of each nation on a given subject were submitted to each of the other nations separately, and not until they had been thus approved did they pass on to the General Session of the Council. Within the several nations all members might be present, but only such as were designated by rule could vote. The action of the General Sessions, of which forty-five were held during the four years, seems to have been hardly more than the ratification of what had already been determined upon by the nations.

Even in the General Session, the principle of voting by nations was maintained. After nearly two years of experiment an attempt was made to introduce a majority rule in the final vote, but it was defeated after a rather bitter debate. The ancient theory of unanimity was sustained. Our informant, the French Cardinal Filastre, says that the proposal of majority action was regarded as a sharp trick for some hidden purpose (*astute excogitatum ad aliquos occultos fines*). The procedure by

nations did not, so far as we know, rest upon any formal decree of the Council. It seems to have been adopted by the nations themselves as a measure of practical utility, and to have been accepted by the Roman curial interests as a compromise to avoid worse extremities. The details have to be gathered from rather obscure and scattered hints and references, but the main facts are fairly established. This national and international procedure gave at once to the Council that character as a European Congress which distinguishes it sharply from all previous assemblies. As the debates went on it became increasingly evident that the objects desired by the reforming elements were very largely financial in character and were to be gained only through the action of the national governments. The financial system by which the Papacy lived and thrived had for two generations past been based upon an elaborate scheme of taxation on benefices. Every vacancy in an ecclesiastical office which by any ingenuity could be brought into any sort of relation to the Roman Curia was filled by nomination from Rome, and for this nomination a tax proportioned to the revenues of the benefice was imposed and generally collected. For the higher positions candidates were freely offered by the papal government and accepted with as good grace as might be by the local authorities. Two obvious evils resulted from this practice. Benefices were filled with foreigners bound rather to the interests of Rome than to those of the national state, and money, scarce at best, was diverted from national uses to the support of a power which by its very nature was hostile to every strong local government.

Protests there had been in plenty. England had sought to defend her interests by the famous Statutes of Provisors and *Præmunire*. France had tried to solve her own problem by keeping a hand on the Papacy within her own borders. Germany had sent out a long series

of *Gravamina* in which her wrongs were set forth with convincing eloquence. The trouble was, that by playing off these separate powers against each other the clever politicians of the Roman Curia succeeded in preventing any effective common action. By avoiding direct issues, by bargaining wherever possible, and by the more or less discreet use of the sadly blunted weapons of spiritual discipline the day of reckoning had been postponed. Now, at Constance, the floodgates of the opposition were opened, and from an early moment it became clear that the ancient devices were, at least for the time, utterly discredited. The question was whether this new enthusiasm for Reform would hold out against the marvelously organized and resourceful institution it was seeking to improve.

The actual working-out of reform measures was entrusted to a Reform Commission of thirty-five, representing the nations and including three cardinals. This commission was appointed in July, 1415, and continued in existence for about two years. Its work was continually interrupted by contentions among the nations themselves and undermined by the jealous activity of the curial or papalist party represented by the College of Cardinals as a whole. The result was that in these two years nothing was accomplished by way of reform, except a rather elaborate scheme which never came to a vote in the Council itself. A second commission of twenty-five was appointed in July, 1417, and succeeded in getting an agreement of the nations upon five points, which were then adopted by the Council. Three of these are worth our attention. The first provided for frequent and regular councils, of which the next should meet five years after the present one, the next seven years later, and thereafter every ten years a council should assemble as by law. In case of a future schism in the Papacy a council should assemble of its own motion

without a call. The whole system of financial exactions, of which the so-called *Spolia*, rights of spoil, were the most outrageous, were to be abolished or reduced to lowest terms.

It is obvious that if these reforms could have been carried out in the spirit in which they were voted by the Council, the whole constitution of the Church would have been radically changed. In place of the monarchical-absolutist mediæval government of the Roman Papacy there would have been substituted a constitutional-aristocratic system. The balance of power would, as the Catholic historian Hefele well says, have been thrown on the side of the episcopate, and the episcopate was everywhere more and more coming to be an integral part of the national state. This alternative was cleverly perceived by the curial party, represented, so far as it was represented at all, by the College of Cardinals and supported on the whole by the Italians, French, and Spaniards, while the Germans and English stood out for the Reform.

Again, after these two years of wrestling, this main issue was brought out more clearly than ever. It had become perfectly evident that the question of church government could not be separated from the infinitely complicated network of political interests represented by the several nations. The discussions between the idealists, the "intellectuals" from the universities, and the hard-headed politicians of the several courts of Europe, might go on forever without reaching a practicable working solution. All this tended to the advantage of the only party which had behind it a unified tradition and a clear idea of what it wanted for the future, the party of the Roman Curia. The conduct of the cardinals, twenty-three in number, was throughout extraordinarily discreet, moderate, and persistent. Among them were some of the most active reformers.

It was Peter D'Ailly, Cardinal of Cambrai, who carried through the Council the all-comprehensive declaration: "The Council is above the Pope." An Italian cardinal, Zabarella, had been the spokesman of the Reform Commission. There had been times when the more radical elements, notably the Germans, had suggested the abolition of the College as the worst obstacle to the re-constitution of the Church. Its natural leader, the pope himself, had abandoned it and left it to weather the storm of abuse alone.

The success of the Cardinalate in keeping itself together and lending a hand where it could, gave it a standing by which it was now to profit. The old wrangle as to precedence of business was now, after two years, renewed with redoubled force, and the Cardinalate was able to throw its weight decisively in favor of proceeding at once to the election of a pope, as the only way of reconciling differences and breaking what had threatened to become a fatal deadlock. Indeed, it had only been by means of ceaseless activity and occasional stretches of the police power of the emperor, that the Council had of late been held together at all.

On the problem of the papal election opinions were widely divided. Should the Council accept the result of the Council of Pisa, acknowledge John XXIII with all his crimes upon his head as lawful pope, and proceed to depose his two rivals already set aside at Pisa? That was probably the original plan; but it had been definitely abandoned after the scandalous flight and trial of Pope John. Or, again, should the Council tie itself to one of the other popes, and thus renew the century-long conflict between the interests of France as against all the rest of Europe? That too had become out of the question. The only course was to wipe off the slate and begin over again. Long and tedious negotiations with the Italian and the French claimants resulted finally in a reasonable

prospect that they could be disposed of, and the Council went ahead with its electoral plans.

Here once more the question of procedure became a vital one. The principle of papal election through a College of Roman clergymen established in the middle of the eleventh century, had fixed itself upon the Church as the most effective way of enforcing the theory of the Papacy as the bishopric of Rome in succession to the alleged bishopric of Peter. In order to preserve this tradition intact the Council of Pisa had, to use its own phrase, "committed the election to the College of Cardinals." At Constance the radical party was inclined to side-track the cardinals entirely and cause the Council to elect a pope by its own right as the supreme representative of the entire Christian body. But a pope so elected would obviously have been, not the successor of St. Peter by vote, as the canon law put it, of "the clergy and people of Rome," but only a presiding officer selected without reference to his Roman connection. Fortunately wiser counsels prevailed, and the matter was intrusted to an Electoral Commission composed of six representatives from each of the five nations with the twenty-three cardinals added as a separate "nation." Two-thirds of the members from each nation and two-thirds of the College of Cardinals must agree upon the candidate. Every precaution was taken to secure the inviolability of the Conclave, and after three days, on the 11th of November, Cardinal Otto Colonna, a Roman nobleman of high reputation for piety and ability, was declared pope. He took the name of Martin V.

Thus two of the three original problems of this great conference appeared to be solved: heresy had been emphatically repudiated, and a unified government had been given to the Church of the West. It will surprise no one who has followed the course of the reform propositions at Constance, that the jubilation over these two

successes should have tended to overshadow interest in Reform. Now that the Christian world had a head once more, it was obviously reasonable that he should be given the opportunity to show how far he was willing to go towards satisfying the universal demand for substantial changes in the papal administration. The answer was not long in coming, Within twenty-four hours after his election Pope Martin issued a decree confirming in all essentials the rules of the papal Chancery according to which the whole elaborate system of papal revenues from benefices was administered. The machinery began to work at once, and the usual unseemly scramble for office and privilege gave full occupation to the army of secretaries that had survived the numerous changes of the Curia.

At the same time the new pope professed himself the champion of reform and appointed a third Reform Commission to prepare and report a scheme. In the discussions and in the report of this commission are clearly outlined the two lines of policy which were to form the most significant developments of the next generation. On the one hand, we find a series of general propositions largely of a moral sort, on which all the nations were agreed. On the other, we see the insidious beginnings of a process which after a century of experiment ended, as it must end, in the glorious revolt, the reluctant secessions, and the permanent schisms of the Protestant Revolution. This was the process indicated by the fatal word "Concordat." The papal power, unable to satisfy all the nations at once, proposed a series of separate agreements with each of them in turn. The nations, on their side, wearied with the long delays at Constance, were inclined to go at least part way towards a working compromise. The Council as a whole could accept the general suggestions of the Reform Commission and was not unwilling to leave the rest to the bargaining of the

several nations. Reform at Constance remained largely in the sphere of pious wishes.

It is this fact that has led even so clear-seeing an historian as Bishop Creighton to describe the Council of Constance as a failure. If by that is meant that it came pitifully short of fulfilling the ardent hopes of the best minds, then it was a failure. If, however, we weigh and measure the extraordinary display of activities crowded into those four eventful years, our verdict must be a very different one. For the first time in the history of Europe the great nations as such had met for conference on matters of the highest importance to them all. Their discussions had gone to the very heart of the several problems involved. The ablest men of the day had expressed themselves with unheard-of freedom and frankness. The sounding universalities of the Middle Ages had received a blow from which they were never to recover. The principle of the national state as the defender of the rights and liberties of its subjects had been asserted in ways that were never again to be seriously questioned. I submit that this cannot be described as failure. Finally, the Council in adjourning provided for its continuation, and thus prepared the way for the still more radical Council of Basel, which for seventeen years maintained in the North a tribunal where every problem of European politics came again to discussion.

The analogies between the situation at Constance and that of the present moment have, I hope, become a little clearer from this hasty survey. We too have to meet the conflicting claims of the nations over against the insistent demands of certain universal ideas. It is no longer the Church which voices these demands most clearly. It is the sense of common interest among certain classes cutting crosswise through the national lines. At Constance, back of all the articulate expressions of partisan claims, lay the subtler but none the less decisive

demands of a population emerging from the social and industrial conditions of the Middle Ages and trying blindly to adjust itself to those of the modern world. So today, behind all the obvious motives of national self-interest and behind all the glowing idealisms of our prophets, is working the silent force of the great transition, as yet unaccomplished, from the age of the horse-plough and the hand-loom to the age of the steam tractor and the wireless telegraph. It is only as the negotiators at Paris shall have the insight to perceive and the courage to proclaim a just balance between these conflicting forces, that they can escape the reproach of apparent failure which has fallen upon the Fathers at Constance.

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE
BELIEF IN IMMORTALITY

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The individual's attitude toward the Determiner of Destiny, which is religion, has always an essentially practical coloring. It involves a belief, to be sure, but this belief is never a matter of pure theory; it bears a reference, more or less explicit, to the fate of the individual's values. Hence in nearly every religion which history has studied or anthropology discovered, the question of the future in store for the individual believer has been one of prime importance. The content of this belief is a question for the theologian and the historian of religion; the psychologist, however, may be able to throw some light on the related question *why* people believe, or fail to believe, in immortality at all. What, in short, are the psychological sources from which this belief springs, and what are the leading types of this belief?

If I may trust the data that I have collected in various ways upon this question, I may say briefly and at once, that faith in a future life seems as a rule to be based either (1) on primitive credulity, authority, and habit, (2) on reason, (3) on some form of feeling, or (4) on will.

With nearly all of us who are brought up in religious surroundings, belief in a life after death *begins* as a matter of authority and of primitive credulity. And with many a pious soul, untroubled by a disturbing critical faculty, the belief continues to be based on authority to the end of life. As nothing disturbs it and as it is nourished

rather than weakened by the only intellectual atmosphere to which it is exposed — namely the sermons of the pastor and a few religious books — it grows into a habit which finally becomes too strong to fear attack. With nearly every one of us, in fact, belief based on authority and habit is stronger than we are usually willing to admit. It forms the background of faith in immortality with many a man and woman who likes to think that some argument is the really decisive factor. At times of mental alertness the argument may stand forward as the great protagonist of faith; but when the mind grows weary, it is usually the tradition and the habit of childhood — always there in the background — which come forth as the really decisive forces.

I am inclined to think that belief in a future life is less often based upon argument than is belief in God. Certainly this source of faith in man's immortality contributes far less of strength than does any of the other three suggested above — at any rate if we take into account only its *direct* contribution. The arguments that men offer in support of their faith are in most cases of a negative sort, aiming to show that those who deny the eternal life are no more justified by logic and evidence than are the believers, and thus leaving the door open to faith if one wills to make the faith-venture. More positive arguments are sometimes given. To those who start out with the view that this is a moral universe or that there is a just God, the idea of death ending all seems incongruous and therefore untenable; the evils of this life must be righted somewhere and somehow, the good rewarded and justice done. So far as I can judge, however, this argument is less generally impressive than it was a generation ago. Probably the argument that is both most generally persuasive and logically the soundest consists in pointing out the essential difference between consciousness and its processes, on the one

hand, and the material world and its laws, on the other. This is, of course, the essence of the Platonic arguments, and nothing better is likely ever to be suggested.

The more deep-lying influences productive of faith in immortality are to be found in the realms of feeling and will. At first sight it may seem odd that feeling can give strength to a belief about the future; but on further reflection it will be plain that there is nothing at all strange about this. For the belief in question is not one of reasoning but of immediate feeling; and if an idea is vividly presented and is felt to be congruous with one's background sense of reality, it is *ipso facto* felt as real. Belief of this emotional type as applied to immortality is of various sorts. Many persons who feel it strongly are unable to analyse it, and can describe it only as a "feeling" or an "instinct," or by some other word which in its non-technical sense is sufficiently vague. In most cases it seems to be based upon a direct apprehension of the essential worth of the self; going back, I suppose, to the instinct of self-assertion — if indeed it does not go back farther than any instinct. The individual is conscious of inherent powers and purposes too great to be exhausted here, and feels that his own nature is such that the death of the body is irrelevant to its life. This is not an argument nor a demand, but an immediate sense that the death of the spirit is intolerably — almost ludicrously — incongruous with what one feels of indubitable reality within. This kind of belief is usually very strong, and has the added advantage of being at its strongest at exactly the times when it is most needed. It is not, however, for all, and I cannot say that those in whom it is the dominant type of faith form a very large class.

Far and away the largest of our four classes is the fourth — those, namely, whose faith is based chiefly on desire. The nature of this desire varies with different people. The fundamental as well as the most wide-

spread and influential form of it is simply the love of life as such, the instinctive impulse which normally makes men cling to life, however wretched they may be. In the words of Wijnaendts Francken, "The demand for self-preservation is one of our most powerful instincts; it transcends the tomb itself; for the desire for immortality is nothing else than one form of the search for self-preservation."¹ This sometimes expresses itself in instinctive horror at the thought of death — a point of view so vividly exemplified by many passages in the *Book of the Dead*. Horror at the destruction of the body, of course, plays no part in the desire for immortality today; yet dread of annihilation is with many still as strong as was fear of the tomb with the ancient Egyptian. If I may trust the replies of my respondents and Schiller's report of the responses to the S. P. R. questionnaire, the desire for eternal bliss seems to have little to do with the faith in question. Possibly I should mention one kind of happiness as an exception to this statement; for hope of reunion with one's friends is certainly one of the very largest factors in the desire for immortality. The demand for moral progress, for enlarged opportunity for service, and for a better chance for those who have had no chance here, are mentioned not infrequently by my respondents among the reasons why immortality is wished for. But quite as common as this desire for a future life on its own account is the demand that it shall exist in order to give meaning and significance to this life. Thus we are brought back again to that inherent demand for conscious life as such, for an endless continuation of spiritual opportunity, which is at the bottom of so much of the earnest desire for immortality. As we have seen, it is based upon an instinct — if indeed it be not ultimately based on something deeper still — and it manifests itself through all grades of spiritual development,

¹ *Psychologie de la Croyance en l'Immortalité*, *Revue Philosophique*, LVI, 278.

from the unthinking, organic fear of death, up to the longing of the artist, the philosopher, and the mystic.

Now for the other side. Having seen some of the psychological sources of belief in a future life, we may ask, What are the psychological influences involved in the doubt or denial of a future life? In a general way, of course, the answer is to be found in the absence of those causes which our study has shown us lead to belief. In the first place, we must recognize that a fairly large number of persons have no real desire for life after death. The causes of this indifference are not easy to ascertain with any degree of completeness or exactitude. Possibly some guidance may be found in a comparison of our times with the Middle Ages. The loss of desire for a future life in the last 500 years is due in part to the greater attractiveness of this world in our times and the increase of interests of all sorts which keep one's attention too firmly fastened here to allow of much thought being spent on the other world. As people cease to think about a future life it becomes less vivid to them and hence less an object of desire. The shattering of authority and the weakening in popular estimation of the arguments in its favor have also had the same tendency of making it seem less real and hence less genuinely longed for. For desire and belief are *mutually* helpful; not only does desire tend to beget belief, but some sort of belief in at least the possibility of the object is a condition of any real desire for it. In the 15th and 16th centuries men so desired the spring of perpetual youth that they were willing to risk all they had in the search for it. Youth is no less loved today, but it can hardly be said that anyone ardently desires to discover a spring whose magical waters would make it perpetual. We do not desire it as our ancestors did, because we no longer harbor it in our thoughts as a genuinely possible object of discovery. Other causes for the loss of desire for

immortality besides its lessening vividness are of course at work in various individuals — and always have been. Distaste for life in general, weariness, and dread of responsibility, tend to make one look forward to death as the definitive end with carelessness or even with longing.² Cases of this sort, however, are not common, and are probably little commoner today than in previous ages. The great cause of the loss of desire is the indifference described above, due to the disappearance of the vitality of belief.

I have no idea to what extent the change in the intellectual atmosphere of modern society has undermined emotional belief, but there can be no doubt that it has been the great factor in weakening belief from authority. And here the various arguments against human survival of death have been reinforced by all the rationalistic influences of every sort that have been steadily wearing away the authority of Bible, Church, and tradition these many years. Hence from several sides is borne in upon us the immense influence of thought in determining belief. This influence as it comes to bear upon the individual is largely indirect and largely negative, and for that reason when one studies the particular positive beliefs of individual men and women, thought seems to have a very second rate — or fourth rate — position. But when we take into consideration the movement of society during several centuries we see that the influence of thought (directly upon society and indirectly upon the individual) is of prime importance — something too often forgotten by the enthusiastic anti-intellectualism of our day. In fact, it would be a mistake to say that thought modifies

² Leuba sums up the causes for this loss of desire as he views them in the following words: "A weariness of existence, temperamental or the fruit of age or of other circumstances; a disposition to enjoy the mood that informs Bryant's noble poem, *Thanatopsis*; and especially, perhaps, an inability to picture in intelligible and acceptable form a future life, suffice to make of a death that ends all a satisfactory, even a desirable goal." (*The Belief in God and Immortality*, p. 301.)

the individual's belief only indirectly; for if we take into account its negative and destructive influence, its action is certainly direct enough. This destructive action of thought upon belief takes place more frequently and more easily today because of the psychological atmosphere that has been produced by the successive triumphs of natural science. Students of science are less likely to believe in immortality than others, not because the arguments against it are stronger than those for it, nor yet because they see the logical difficulties in the way of immortality more clearly than do those whose thought has been engaged chiefly in other lines, but largely because their training has produced in them a habit of regarding the scientific laws of the material world with the same sort of reverence that the old-fashioned Christian feels toward the teaching of Scripture. While scientists as a class are less likely to believe in the survival of bodily death than others, there are significant differences between different classes of scientists. Statistics indicate that over fifty per cent of the historians and physical scientists believe in immortality, while among the biologists and psychologists the percentage of belief is notably lower. This fact is undoubtedly due to the constant effort made by both the latter classes to view the phenomena of life and mind in terms of something like mechanical sequence; an effort which with some has become a habit, and by some is regarded as a presupposition of scientific procedure.

The truth is, non-belief, like belief, draws its strength not only from reason but from authority; in fact, for many enthusiastic students of science the will not to believe has a good deal to do with the result. In certain scientific circles it is not good form to believe in a future life; and the ascetic ideal which would sacrifice selfish interests for the personal values of science also comes into play. Moreover non-belief, like belief, is not merely a

product of logical argument, authority, habit, and volition, but is largely influenced also by the imagination; and the peculiarly objective point of view which natural science inculcates and the habit it produces of considering causation and the laws of matter universal and invariable, give a certain cast to the imagination which makes the idea of the survival of bodily death increasingly difficult.

This question of the imagination is most fundamental to the understanding of belief and disbelief. It is very difficult to believe earnestly in anything that we can in no way image to ourselves; and this general fact finds ample application and illustration in the field under discussion. Though no doubt there are exceptions, it is still a very general truth that those who deny a future life are those who find it impossible to imagine it in vivid and persuasive fashion; while they have few doubts on the subject who find little difficulty in imagining it and who perhaps would find it difficult to imagine death ending all. Belief and disbelief would therefore seem, in one sense, to be correlative to two types of imagination or two points of view from which the imagination regards the future life.

We can best get at these two types of imagination by contrasting two classes of persons who are known to have quite different views on the subject of immortality. Perhaps no large class of men are more given to a skeptical or even materialistic view on this subject than physicians; and probably none have more genuine faith in a future life than clergymen. Doubtless differences of opinion on authority and on the logic of various arguments have much to do with this difference of belief; but these things do not fully explain the contrast. The physician finds it hard to imagine, with any reality-feeling, life after death, while the clergyman finds it easy to do so. And the reason for this is largely to be found in the fact that

the physician tends to think of death from the point of view of the body, and that death means to him usually the death of some one else; whereas the clergyman views death more subjectively and from the point of view of the "soul." The physician takes the objective view of death. All his experience, his training, his daily work, his professional habits of thought, lead him to this. Inevitably death means to him the ceasing to function of certain vital organs. Thus it comes about that even when he thinks of his own death he pictures it also objectively — externally; he sees his body lying on a bed; his heart ceasing to beat, his respiration stopped. Those manifestations of life in which he is professionally interested he pictures at an end; and that *means* to him that life has ceased. As dies the beast, so dies the man — literally true from an external viewpoint certainly. As this habit of thought grows upon the physician or scientist, he finds it increasingly difficult to hold alongside with it the old view, taught him in childhood, that conscious life continues beyond the grave. To believe it might be logical enough, but he finds it very hard to imagine with any lively sense of reality.

The clergyman, on the other hand, thinks of death, as I have said, from the point of view of the "soul." Death means to him primarily *his* death; that is the type of death for him. He thinks of other people's death as meaning what his own death would mean. That is, he views death from the subjective, or, rather, the inner point of view. Very likely he knows little enough about the physiology of death: or if he is versed in this aspect of the case, it is not this primarily that he thinks about. Death means to him a form of subjective experience, not a physiological phenomenon. His whole training and his daily work enforce this view. As a result it is very easy for him to imagine a continuation of conscious existence after death; in fact, it may be difficult for him to

imagine the contrary. And of course not only is this true of ministers but it holds frequently of many other men whose thoughts are habitually occupied with the spiritual and inner side of life. Goethe is quoted as saying, "It is, to a thinking being, quite impossible to think himself non-existent, ceasing to think and live." This is the natural attitude of the untaught mind. It is with a tremendous shock of surprise that the child learns that he must some day die; and for a considerable time most children probably refuse really to believe it. The belief that life as a matter of course will not end seems to be almost as natural as the desire that it should continue. The idea that life will end may be logical but it is an acquired and secondary product.

"All men think all men mortal but themselves."

There are several reasons for this. For one thing, it is hard to think of the world continuing to run along and we not here to witness it. We are all incipient Berkleyans, at least to the extent that in our image of various external events there is usually, in the background of our minds, an implicit recognition of its relation or possible relation to us. We picture ourselves as the hidden beholders of all that we imagine. More important than this is the fact that the thought of one's self ceasing to exist is most difficult for the natural man, quite aside from his relation to the external world. Our past experience of consciousness is of a stream which, in spite of its temporary breaks in sleep, still seems to us really continuous and without conscious beginning or end. We have gone to sleep many times, but always to wake once more. *We have got into the habit of being alive.* Hence the association of non-being with ourselves is unnatural and difficult. Nor do past experience and the laws of association and habit explain the whole matter. Life somehow *feels* itself and *wills* itself to be end-

less — not explicitly, but by a violent reaction against the idea of extinction. To look at oneself objectively, from an exterior point of view, as one of those things which may cease to be, requires a considerable degree of sophistication, and both in the individual and in the race it is learned only with difficulty.

The two types of imagination that I have been describing — the external and the inner — are to be found not only in different individuals with different kinds of training; they may alternate within the same individual under varying circumstances. If I may take myself as an example, I find my own belief in a future life at its strongest when thinking of my own death. At such a time it is unnatural for me to take any but the subjective and inner point of view; so that the thought often gives me a kind of secret exhilaration such as one feels who sees his enemy in the distance and cries "Come on!" But when I see a person die I am sometimes very skeptical. I remember seeing a man run over by a train, and being surprised to find how hard it was for me to believe that the man's consciousness still existed or would ever exist again.

But difficulties connected with the imagination are responsible for another source of weakness in the belief in immortality, in addition to this objective and external mode of representation. Belief in an abstract truth, a truth which can be conceived but not imagined, is usually cold and lacking in that vividness which is the primitive touchstone of reality. The more concrete details that can be added to our mental picture, the more real does it become to us. This increased sense of reality through imagined details is the effect which the historical novel has — or should have — upon the reader. It makes Louis XI or Richard I real and living to us by supplying a host of concrete details which add the very warmth of life to characters that had been but names before.

Now it is the impossibility of surrounding the idea of the next world with any concrete details which are not themselves almost impossible, that makes the belief in question so hard for many to retain. If the departed really still have conscious existence, what are they doing? What are the conditions of their life? What are their employments and their pleasures? If we allow ourselves to ponder over these questions, most of us will find our notion of a future life taking on the color of a fairy tale. The questions, if we face them steadily, demand some kind of answer; and yet almost any conceivable answer that shall be put in vivid detail will make the belief all the more difficult. The historical attempts that have been made to picture the next world so as to give it the reality-feeling that comes from vivid images, have all had but very moderate and temporary success. From the *Book of the Dead*, through Virgil, Dante, Milton, down to *Gates Ajar*, the descriptions in our hymn books, and the latest revelations of the spiritualists, they all seem either mythical or puerile, so far as they are given in terms of detailed imagination. And the same thing surely is true of the *Book of the Revelation*. The Bible elsewhere on this point is wisely reticent. Jesus had no descriptive phrases for the life of heaven which were anything more than plainly symbolic. And his immediate followers perceived the wisdom of his example. "Eye hath not seen nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things that God hath prepared for them that love Him."

For from the nature of the case, all the material for the details of another life must be drawn from this; and yet it is plain that if there is a future life (unless we adopt the conception of reincarnation), it must be in many of its details and surroundings very different from this. Hence the ascription to it of images drawn from this life strikes us as inharmonious and incongruous. The idea

therefore never gets dressed out in the details which are so helpful in imparting reality-feeling, and for most of us it remains always largely abstract and verbal. Hence the large number of people who, while not denying it, and even willing to say that they suppose they believe in it, are quite indifferent to it and never give it a thought. The imaginative difficulties in it are such that it resembles one of those small stars which can be seen only by indirect vision, and which disappear when looked at directly. Many people find that their belief in immortality is strongest when they think least about it.

There are two or three classes of people whose faith in a future life is not greatly affected by the difficulties we have been discussing. These are, in the first place, that small class of thinkers who have trained themselves to live so constantly in a world of concepts that lack of imaginative vividness is no loss. Much larger is the class of uncritical believers, whose faith is based upon authority, and who either find no difficulty in accepting the pictures in *The Revelation*, or else possess so strong a faith that difficulties in imagining a future life are powerless against it. A smaller but in many ways more interesting class are the mystics. For them the difficulties which others feel are not overcome but quite lacking. They will tell you that they cannot only conceive but imagine — or rather directly experience — what the future life will be, at least in its most important aspect. For them the most significant feature of that life will be its union with the Divine; and this is for them, they insist, no mere verbal phrase nor abstract idea nor pious hope, but a genuine and very real experience of this present life. People such as these need no detailed descriptions of how the dead are raised up or with what body they shall come. The details they can leave with perfect confidence for the future to reveal. The substance they already possess.

For the great majority who are not mystics, however, the difficulty of giving the future life any imaginative reality must always be a source of real weakness in belief. If they cling to the hope, they usually avoid any serious attempt to picture the details of the future life, either dodging the question altogether or refusing to take any suggested answer seriously. One of my respondents — a student of natural science, who yet hopes for and believes in immortality — writes: “To hold this faith without picturing the nature of the future life I find impossible; but I manage with ease and naturalness to keep those mental pictures in a flux, as it were, making them the poetry of my faith without giving them the definiteness which would challenge my own scientific criticism.” This man’s position is the wise one for most people who desire to keep their faith. Belief in a future life, like belief in God, is usually an *attitude*, a way of holding oneself in relation to the future, quite as much as a definable concept, and certainly more than a detailed picture. To try to turn it into the latter, either in oneself or in others, is surely not wise. “How are the dead raised up and with what body do they come? Thou fool!”

These then are some of the psychological influences tending to weaken the belief in a future life. Having considered this general question, it may be of some interest to consider briefly the more special question of the weakening of this belief within Christianity. For that it is being weakened I suppose there is little doubt, and that it is being weakened more rapidly in western Christendom than in other parts of the world seems probable. One of the things that strikes one most forcibly on a visit to India — at least if I may trust my own experience — is the vitality of the belief in immortality among all classes of society except those that have come under Western influence. Not only does there seem to be comparatively

little theoretical skepticism on the subject; the belief seems to hold a vital place in the lives of a surprisingly large proportion of the people. The chief cause for this contrast is undoubtedly the fact already pointed out, that modern Western science tends both to destroy authority, undermine various ancient arguments in favor of immortality, and also induce a form of imagination distinctly hostile to this belief. I think, however, there are several additional factors which give Hinduism a certain advantage over Christianity in nourishing a strong belief in immortality. One of them is connected with the question of the imagination already discussed. The Hindu finds no difficulty whatever in imagining the next life, for his belief in reincarnation teaches him that it will be just this life over again, though possibly at a slightly different social level. I am inclined to think, moreover, that the Christian and the Hindu customs of disposing of the dead body may have something to do with this contrast in the strength of their beliefs. Is it not possible that the perpetual presence of the graves of our dead tends to make Christians implicitly identify the lost friend with his body, and hence fall into the objective, external form of imagination about death that so weakens belief in the continued life of the soul? We do not teach this view to our children in words, but we often do indirectly and unintentionally by our acts. The body — which *was* the visible man — is put visibly into the grave and the child knows it is there; and at stated intervals we put flowers on the grave — an act which the child can hardly interpret otherwise than under the category of giving a present to the dead one. And so it comes about that while he is not at all sure just where Grandpa is, he is inclined to think that he is up in the cemetery. Much of our feeling and of our really practical and vital beliefs on this subject, as on most others, is of course derived from our childhood impressions. And so it comes about

that this attitude toward the body and the grave is not confined to children. Says Agnes in Ibsen's "Brand" of her dead boy Alf, when her husband has reproved her for thinking tenderly of the little body in the grave:

" 'What thou sternly call'st the corse,
 Ah, to me, my child is *there!*
 Where is body, there is soul;
 These apart I cannot keep,
 Each is unto me the whole;
 Alf beneath the snow asleep
 Is my very Alf in heaven.' "

The Hindu is not likely to make this identification. The body of his lost friend is burned within a few hours after death, and the ashes swept into the river and forever dispersed. There is no body left and no grave in which he may center his thoughts of the departed. If he is to think of him at all, it cannot be of his body and must be of his soul. The Christian decks the tomb of his departed one with flowers; the Hindu instead performs an annual Shraddha ceremony to the spirits of those gone before.

But there is, I believe, one further reason for the greater strength of the Hindu faith over the Christian, and that is to be found in the contrast between the two conceptions of immortality. In the Christian view the soul's survival of death is essentially miraculous. The soul is conceived as coming into existence with the birth of the body, and the thing to be expected is that it should perish when the body perishes. This is prevented through the intervention, so to speak, of God, who steps in and rescues the soul and confers upon it an immortality which, left to itself, it could never attain. Thus it comes about that when the idea of supernatural intervention has been generally discarded, and even the belief in God as an active force outside of nature has been weakened —

as is the case all over western Christendom — there is little left to support the belief in the continued existence of the soul after the death of the body. In India all this is changed. The soul's immortality has there never been thought dependent upon any supernatural interference or miraculous event, nor even upon God himself. There are atheistic philosophers in India, but they are as thoroughly convinced of the eternal life of the soul as are the monist and the theist. For in India the soul is *essentially* immortal. Its eternity grows out of its very nature. It did not begin to be when the body was born, and hence there is no reason to expect that it will cease to be when the body dies. Existence is a part of its nature. If you admit a beginning for it, you put it at once out of the class of the eternal things, and are forced to hang its future existence upon a miracle. But for the Hindu "the knowing self is not born; it dies not. It sprang from nothing; nothing sprang from it. It is not slain though the body be slain."³

But while it is hardly to be questioned that the belief in immortality is less widespread with us than it is with the Indians, it would be a great mistake to regard it as a secondary and unimportant part of Christianity as Christianity is actually believed and felt and lived today. Christianity, like Hinduism, has always considered faith in immortality one of the essential aspects of religion. Not all historical religions have done this. The Old Testament made little of personal immortality, as did also the classical form of Paganism, while orthodox Buddhism of the "southern" type seems to deny it altogether. But Christianity has persistently and steadily put its emphasis upon this larger human hope. And if we base our judgment as to what Christianity believes, not on the aggregate of persons who inhabit Christendom

³ Katho Upanishad I. 1. I have discussed this question at greater length in my "India and Its Faith." Pp. 105-107.

but upon those Christians whom popular thought singles out easily as religious people, we shall find that the hope of eternal life is still one of the essential and characteristic elements of Christianity. The difficulties in the conception which I have pointed out are undoubtedly present, and the faith of many Christians is plainly weaker because of them. Yet in spite of these things faith in immortality is still a living and most important part of the Christian conviction.

I am aware that this is not the opinion of all who have studied the subject. Thus Dr. G. Stanley Hall writes: "As to *immortality* in the orthodox sense of the word, if men really believed that there was another life vastly better and more desirable in every way than this, the world would soon be depopulated, for all would emigrate from it, unless fear of the mere act of dying deterred them. At least all the strong and enterprising souls would go. But in fact even those surest of Heaven stay here to the latest possible moment, and use every means at their disposal not to graduate into the *Jenseits*, even though their lives in this world be miserable. Does not this show that belief in post-mortem life is a convention, a dream-wish?"⁴

The fallacy of the argument used in this quotation is presumably plain enough. The fact that people do not commit suicide is no proof that they do not believe in a future life, as Dr. Hall would have us think; it shows merely that the instinctive impulse for self-preservation, combined with the reiterated teachings of the Christian churches that suicide is a great sin, has strength enough to keep those who believe the other life is best still on this side, until it is God's will to take them. But aside from this psychologically sound explanation of the matter, and even if we were dealing with the (psychologically

⁴Thanatophobia and Immortality. American Journal of Psychology, October, 1915, p. 579.

quite impossible) cold intelligences that President Hall for the moment seems to believe in, the utmost that his test proves is that religious people prefer one life at a time; that no matter how fair the next life may prove to be, they prefer to postpone it till the hour comes and they are ripe for it.

The question of the intensity of belief in what Dr. Hall, in characteristic phrase, calls the "post-mortem perduration of personality,"⁵ is not to be settled in so simple a fashion. For many indifferent people it may be what Dr. Hall calls it — "a kiosk in Kamchatka, which believers have invested something in and fitted out with such comforts as they can" — "better fifty years of earth than a cycle of Heaven." But for many a religious soul — and for many more of them than Dr. Hall evidently supposes — the hope of eternal life is something truly vital and fundamental, something too sacred and profound to be treated intelligently in Dr. Hall's flippant phrases. It may be that my experience is untrustworthy, but certainly it has been my observation that among religious people the hope and belief in a future life are very central to their religion. The results of my questionnaire show the same fact, if they can be trusted to show anything at all. Among one hundred and forty-seven respondents, one hundred and thirty-one believed in a future life, as against sixteen who were agnostic. Of fifty-seven respondents to a question concerning the growth or decay of the belief, forty-five insisted that their faith in immortality was increasing, seven noticed no change, and five found a decrease. I should claim no value for these figures were it not that I believe my respondents to have been fairly representative religious people, and that the tone of their answers is quite in accord with what the figures indicate. The faith in immortality may be less widespread than the belief in a God, though this is

⁵ Educational Problems. New York; Appleton. 1911. Vol. I, p. 144.

doubtful. Leuba's figures would, in fact, indicate the contrary. All the different classes of American scholars whom he investigated, except the psychologists, were found to include a larger percentage of believers in immortality than of believers in a personal God.⁶ Whether this be true of the majority of mankind or not, certainly there is one sense in which the belief in immortality *means* more than the belief in a God. It is less a matter of theory and, when strong, is more personal and practical in its nature. It is far from being merely the continuation of a childish superstition, but, like the belief in God when this is normal, it changes and grows with the growing mind. My respondents may have exaggerated the increase of its strength with their maturing and advancing years, but their testimony is, I believe, trustworthy in so far as it indicates the steady increase of value that this faith has for life. To the religious man and woman this hope-faith becomes increasingly a part of his existence, a secret source of new courage and strength, as the years go by.

It is this essentially pragmatic value of the belief in immortality that I would stress in closing this essay. As the belief in miracles and special answers to prayer and in the interference of the supernatural within the natural has gradually disappeared, almost the only *pragmatic* value of the supernatural left to religion is the belief in a personal future life. In many advanced religious circles the Absolute is climbing the throne of Jehovah, and the idealistic universe which has taken the place of the old one, when examined closely, turns out to be just the materialistic universe with a new set of labels. In such a world only a minimum of pragmatic value is left to "God," and only the belief in human immortality is left us from all the ancient faith which taught that the religious universe was really different and had

⁶Op. cit. Chap. IX.

appreciably different consequences from the non-religious one.

If we affirm with Höffding that, from one point of view at least, "the essence of religion consists in the conviction that value will be preserved,"⁷ then surely the belief in human immortality is very central to it. In a very real sense, moreover, one may say that this faith is psychologically deep-rooted and psychologically justified. For it is based on the clear apprehension of a great truth and a great postulate. The truth is that value and conscious life are correlative terms, and that each is impossible without the other. The postulate is that spiritual life is different in kind from and essentially independent of the world of matter and its laws and operations. Intimately intermingled the two are, but the human spirit has always insisted that they are not identical, and demanded that they shall not be utterly inseparable. The faith in the immortality of man's spirit is the great expression of this postulate, and of the inherently idealistic demand of human nature that the values of the universe shall not wholly perish. In one sense therefore this faith is even more fundamentally human — as it has in fact been more widespread both in space and in time — than the belief in a personal God. For it is essentially humanity's belief in itself, its faith in the highest form of the spiritual life that it has known. The particular forms of this faith have varied with man's changing circumstances through the ages and inevitably will vary. But the fundamental demand for the continuance of conscious and rational life, somewhere and somehow, will pretty certainly last as long as men have ideals and hopes, and continue to take any attitude toward the Determiner of Destiny.

⁷ *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 14 — et passim.

IS THE DESIGN ARGUMENT DEAD?

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The basis of theistic belief is fortunately broader than the theistic arguments. People believe in God before they argue in favor of His existence, and the fortunes of theism are not inseparably bound up with any of the arguments framed in its support. No one, however, who is interested in the rational basis of theology can be indifferent to the fate of an argument which, whatever the philosophical objections to be brought against it, has in all ages of the world made a powerful appeal to human reason.

While objections to the Design Argument alike from the theistic and the anti-theistic camps were made before the time of Kant, the two influences most hostile to it in modern times have been the Kantian philosophy and the Darwinian theory. We know what Heine thought of Kant's theistic philosophy: "I can hear the bell. Kneel down. They are bringing the sacraments to a dying God." The Design Argument was supposed in any case to have received an effectual *coup de grace* at the hands of Darwin, even if it survived the rough handling of Kant's *Critique*.

To destroy knowledge of God in order to make room for faith was the avowed object of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and the argument of the whole work may be said to culminate in the criticism of the theistic proofs. The essence of Kantism, in spite of the elaborate apparatus of the *Critique*, is quite simple, and has been thus expressed by his translator, Max Müller, in his preface: "That

without which experience is impossible, cannot be the result of experience, though it must never be applied beyond the limits of possible experience." A standing objection to Kant is that he himself transcended the limits of "experience" when he asserted the existence of things-in-themselves, but there is another very obvious objection of kindred import. Reason, with Kant as with everybody else, does in fact "soar beyond the world of sense" (p. 477) and "soar above all possible experience" (p. 513), when an inference is drawn to the existence of our fellowmen.

"We are spirits clad in veils,
Man by man was never seen" —

and it is generally believed that he never can be the object of possible sensible experience in the Kantian sense. The principle of the parsimony of causes might lead us to maintain that our fellowmen are automata, as Descartes supposed animals to be, or might even lead us so deep into the abyss of Solipsism as to say (with Tennyson again),

"Thou canst not prove that I, who speak with thee,
Am not thyself in converse with thyself."

The answer to Kant is that we do constantly "soar beyond the world of sense," and if we did not we could not transact the business of life. Why reduce experience to chaos by setting arbitrary limits to knowledge? If we can and do every day transcend "experience" in the narrow sense by inferring intelligence and purpose behind the actions of our fellowmen, why can we not, as Kant himself apparently allows us to do in the preface to his second edition (p. 702), follow the natural bent of the reason and explain "the wonderful beauty, order, and providence, everywhere displayed in nature," by referring them to "a great and wise Author of the World"?

Kant's own admissions in favor of the Design Argument, whether attributed to candor or to inconsistency, do much to dull the edge of his own criticisms. If there is at present an anti-Kantian reaction in philosophy, a re-examination of his critique of the theistic proofs would be timely.

The topic of Darwinism and Design has been worn threadbare in the discussions of the past fifty years, and no re-opening of the question will be fruitful unless it is motivated either by new developments in science or by the discovery of a new philosophical standpoint. The continued criticism of Darwinian Selection, the discussion by Henderson, Wallace, and others of the Fitness of the Environment, and the attempt of Bergson to find a *via media* between Mechanism and Finalism may furnish an excuse for the observations that follow.

I. *Natural Selection and Its Critics.* The great contribution which Darwin made to the thought of the world was, according to Huxley, that he eliminated the teleological factor from the explanation of life. As Weismann, who of course goes beyond Darwin, puts it: "Every species *must* have arisen just where, and when, and in the form in which it actually did arise, as the necessary outcome of the existing conditions of energy and matter, and of their interactions upon each other." Where Weismann puts mechanism in the place of design other interpreters of Darwin substituted chance, and perhaps a cruel chance, mechanism and chance agreeing in the exclusion of purpose.

As Alexander the Great, to the disgust of his Hellenic friends, changed his habits as he extended his conquests, and assumed the dress and manners of the Persians, so the Darwinian theory in extending its dominion over regions remote from the biological field was transformed into a mechanical theory of the universe. J. T. Merx in his *History of European Thought in the 19th Century*

thinks that Darwinism has immensely strengthened the mechanical view of the world. It enthroned mechanism in the very heart of the organic world, where design was suppose to reign. Automatic crowding out, at the expense of those who were crushed, produced overtopping individuals, and these of such excellence that they "give the impression of having been originally designed"; while in fact they are designed as little (or as much) as the tall mountain peak which towers above its neighbor. The secret was out at last. It was shown that a non-purposive mechanism could produce the evidence of design, that the fortuitous could evolve the fit (Vol. ii, pp. 412 f.).

The teleologist will protest against the equation of mechanism with chance which is often assumed in discussions of this character. Mechanism has in fact a closer affinity with purpose than with chance, these two latter being the only two ultimate theories of the universe. All the machines we know about are the result of purpose, and the assumed world-mechanism may naturally be assigned to a similar origin unless there is sufficient reason to the contrary. In human mechanisms the more complicated the machinery and the more elaborate the product, the more evidence is there of a high order of intelligence. The evidence of design is to be found, not in any one wheel or cog, but in the arrangement of the whole, in the coördination of parts and in the product. Kipling's "Secret of the Machines" presents the argument:

"We can pull and haul and push and lift and drive,
We print and plough and weave and heat and light,
We can run and jump and swim and fly and dive,
We can see and hear and count and read and write!

.

Because for all our power and weight and size,
We are nothing more than children of your brain!"

When the man in the street asks who it is that made the mechanism and drives the mechanism, the thorough-going mechanist can only take refuge in a convenient agnosticism. Mechanism is a teleological conception, and it is not to be identified with Chance unless it can be shown how chance can produce the mechanism. Lucretius, it will be remembered, endowed the atoms in their downward movement with a power of declination, a sort of freedom or quasi-consciousness. The fortuitous-concourse theory is still held by so distinguished a writer as Mr. Bertrand Russell in his *Philosophical Essays*; but the belief that the clash of primitive atoms, whether or not endowed with this quasi-consciousness, could result in a cosmos, has been made more difficult by modern physics and astronomy. That "a molecular plebiscite," to use Martineau's phrase, could have resulted in the majestic sweep of an ordered universe, in a unitary world-mechanism, is as improbable as that victory could come to an army each of whose units should hold a referendum before deciding whether to obey the commander's orders.

The case of Darwinism and Design would be simplified if the biologists themselves would decide whether natural selection was the real cause of the appearance of new species. At present the doctors disagree. Professor W. B. Scott in his *Theory of Evolution* (1917) says that the Darwinians are still in the majority or at least have a plurality, since no alternative theory of the origin of species has as many advocates as that of natural selection. His study of fossils, however, leads him to reject Darwinism as not offering an adequate explanation of the observed facts (p. 25), and he quotes Professor Bateson as saying that as to the causes of specific diversity "we have to confess an ignorance almost total." Similarly Professor H. F. Osborn says in his *Origin and Evolution of Life* (1917) that "the causes of the evolution of life

are as mysterious as the law of evolution is certain." A large if not an increasing number of biologists, while dogmatic as to the fact of evolution, are agnostic as to the factors which bring it about. The unsettled state of opinion in scientific circles is reflected by the humorous versifier:

"Let natural selection go;
Its methods are by far too slow.
Poor Darwin's dead, DeVries is king;
Mutations have become the thing."

The final rejection of natural selection would not prove the case for the teleologist, but it would remove from the field the only hypothesis which has attempted to show how chance could mimic the work of design. Professor Scott, while believing that the question of design is metaphysical rather than scientific, puts the case temperately when he says (pp. 30, 31): "In order to hold the evolutionary hypothesis it is not necessary to deny the ideal relationships between the successive gradations of living beings, or to exclude belief in a creative plan, which has been worked out by the method of evolution." The most recent survey of the question from the theological side leads its author to the conviction that "the marks of design which the world exhibits and the testimony which it bears to its Creator, so far from being obscured or diminished by the discovery of the process of Evolution, become clearer, brighter, and more convincing than they ever were before."¹

II. *The Fitness of the Environment.* The world of organisms and organs has been the citadel of the Design Argument, and it was in this citadel that Darwin was supposed to have dealt teleology its death blow. It would be a sort of poetic justice if a new development in evolutionary science should establish teleology again in the stronghold of mechanism, the pre-organic world.

¹ J. N. Shearman, *The Natural Theology of Evolution*, 1916, p. x.

The argument of Professor L. J. Henderson in his striking book, *The Fitness of the Environment* (1913) and in his later article, "The Teleology of Inorganic Nature" (*Philosophical Review*, May, 1916), may be condensed into two propositions: "Logically, in some obscure manner, cosmic and biological evolution are one," and the biologist "may now rightly regard the universe in its very essence as biocentric" (*Fitness*, pp. 278, 312). Further, quoting from his article, the connection between the properties of the three elements, hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen, and the evolution of life which they favor to the maximum extent, is "almost infinitely improbable as the result of chance" (p. 271), and "there is not one chance in millions of millions" that these properties should simultaneously occur.

Professor Henderson has established teleology in a sphere in which there can be no question of selection and its mimicking of design. He has placed an effective weapon in the hands of the theistic philosopher, while he with scientific reserve — for why should the scientist become theologian? — declines to use it himself.² An

² Professor Henderson argues that the order of nature is teleological, but he seeks to share Darwin's agnosticism when it comes to the admission of Mind or Purpose back of nature. Upon this subject, he says, "clear ideas and close reasoning are no longer possible, for thought has arrived at one of its natural frontiers" (p. 281). His positive thesis is (1) that the relation between the original elements and the freedom of evolution is not a chance relation; (2) that the connection between the two "is a causal connection"; (3) that the connection is only intelligible "as a *preparation* for the evolutionary process"; (4) that "we are ignorant of the existence of any cause except mind which can produce results that are fully intelligible only in their relation to later events" (p. 271); and (5) that the relation must be conceived as "teleological," because "there is no other way to describe it" (p. 279). It seems to me that what Professor Henderson says as a scientific specialist may be used to serve the purposes of theistic argument without being discounted by what he says of the frontiers of knowledge.

I do not see that the argument against chance and in favor of teleology is broken by Professor R. B. Perry's criticism in his article, "Purpose as Systematic Unity," in *The Monist*, July, 1917. Professor Perry compares life to a die with the same number on all the faces, while the environment is a die with a million of faces only one of which matches the first die. "That the two should match in any single instance is highly improbable; the chances are millions to one against it. But if it should happen that there was only one trial, its happening to be successful would prove nothing as to there being anything more than chance at work" (p. 373). But

evolutionist of greater fame, the late A. R. Wallace, felt no such scruples. In his latest work, *The World of Life* (1911) taking up the same problem, he speaks of "the existence of a special group of elements possessing such exceptional and altogether extraordinary properties as to render *possible* the existence of vegetable and animal life-forms"; and draws the conclusion that the Mind that caused these elements to exist and then built them up into such marvelous structures "must be many million times greater than those which conceived and executed the modern steam-engine" (p. 416).

To have fitness, preparation, a teleology which excludes chance, or frankly Purpose, thus recognized by competent scientists as lying at the foundation of biological evolution is a gain for the Design Argument, and one from an unexpected quarter. But if a teleological relation is assumed as existing between the inorganic and the organic spheres, surely a similar relation may be assumed between both of these spheres and the realm of humanity. A biocentric view of the world naturally passes over into an anthropocentric view, and we are not surprised to hear Wallace argue that the purpose of the universe is the production of intelligent and moral beings. An astronomer of note, T. C. Chamberlin, closes his recent volume on *The Origin of the Earth* with the remark that "the emergence of what we call the living from the inorganic, and the emergence of what we call the psychic from the physiologic, were at once the transcendent and the transcendental features of the earth's revolution." Such extensions of the Design Argument have

the teleological character of the inorganic world is seen not in the appearance of one element among millions of other possible elements, but in the simultaneous appearance, among other less favorable possibilities, of certain necessary elements, necessary compounds and necessary properties of compounds, all of maximum advantage for life. It is as though there were a million of dice thrown together and all at the first throw turned up sixes. It is this coincidence of factors indefinitely numerous and all coöperating to the maximum freedom of organic evolution that Henderson thinks is staggering to the advocates of chance.

been made, in different ways, by Mr. Balfour and Professor Royce.

Assuming, perhaps too hastily, that in the organic sphere the fortuitous might evolve the fit, and that selection might counterfeit design, Mr. Balfour, in his *Theism and Humanism* (1915) points out the immeasurable improbability that a fortuitous arrangement of molecules should produce not only living matter, but living matter of the kind upon which selection might act. His main purpose, however, is not to carry the argument downward into the pre-organic sphere but upward into the realms of æsthetics, ethics, and science. He would do something "to show that 'design' is demanded by all that we deem most valuable in life, by beauty, by morals, by scientific truth; and that it is design far deeper in purpose, far richer in significance, than any which could be inferred from the most ingenious and elaborate adjustments displayed by organic life" (p. 51).

Professor Royce has given a new turn to the argument for the Fitness of the Environment by insisting in his *Problem of Christianity* that nature, inorganic and organic, is pre-adapted to be understood by human intelligence. That man can weigh the worlds in the balance of his thought, and summarize in his generalizations so vast and complex a range of facts, is an indication that the relation between the facts and the generalizations is not fortuitous. A biocentric view of the universe is of necessity a teleological view, and it naturally points on to an anthropological view. The considerations urged by Henderson and Wallace, while not entirely new in the history of theistic reasoning, have given a new impetus to the Design Argument and have brought within its sweep all the periods of natural history.

III. *Bergson's Critique of Finalism.* The story of evolution as Bergson tells it, certainly in a fascinating manner,

is a drama in three acts. Life or consciousness, the hero, is imprisoned by matter, the villain, and is struggling blindly to be free. In the first act, the vital impulse tunnels its way into the vegetable world; but as it reaches only the lethargy and immobility of vegetable forms, the result is so far a failure. The second act finds consciousness working its way into the animal world and attaining mobility; but, arrested at the stage of instinct, it can only respond to the environment in a way which is patterned after the mechanical action of matter. In the third act, "by a tremendous leap," consciousness, in spite of the efforts of matter to drag it down to the plane of mechanism, reaches at last spontaneity and freedom in man.

By what means then did our hero, life or consciousness, make his escape from imprisoning matter? It was not by Mechanism, for the mechanism of matter was all the time opposing life and hindering its advance. It was not by Chance; for, as Bergson acutely argues in opposition to Darwinian selection, chance could not secure the coördination of parts necessary to the evolution of living beings, nor on different lines of development fashion two organs so much alike as the eye of a mollusk and the eye of a man. It was not by Purpose; for purpose implies finality, fixity, with no play for the reality of freedom or of time. Bergson is evidently in search of a category which shall be neither mechanism, chance, nor purpose; and he finds it in the conception of an original vital impulse, neither mechanistic, fortuitous, nor purposive, working its way toward consciousness and freedom against the downward current of matter.

Sympathizing with Bergson's revolt against mechanism and absolutism, we may venture to ask whether his semi-mystical vital impulse is clearly enough conceived and described to answer the purposes of philosophy, and whether it is able to fulfil its author's intention, namely,

to safeguard free-will and to vindicate the reality of time.

When the curtain rises on Bergson's engaging drama of *Creative Evolution*, the principal actors, life or consciousness and matter, are already on the stage and already in action. But how did life become imprisoned in matter? Whence the impulse to escape from matter's entanglements? And what were the antecedents of matter, the villain of the plot? To these difficult questions we find in Bergson no consistent and satisfactory answer. His prevailing exposition is based on a dualism of life and matter, regarded as two coördinate but antagonistic currents, one moving upward and the other downward. Both life and matter are then to be regarded presumably as manifestations of one underlying principle, if the question of origin is raised. But in the section on the Genesis of Matter he speaks of matter as being the arrest of life, saying that we must believe that life as the inverse of materiality is the creator of matter by its own interruption alone (p. 245). Still a third theory is suggested when it is said that life or consciousness on our planet, before the condensation of nebula was achieved, was in a state of dream or sleep. It took its first flight when by an inverse movement the nebulous matter appeared. Here matter seems in a way to be the creator or at least the awakener of life (pp. 256, 257). Life in fact is defined as a tendency to act on brute matter.

This vacillation in conceiving the relations between life and matter suggests that Bergson's vital impulse is to be regarded as a scientific hypothesis (some would say as a poetic fancy) rather than as an ultimate or metaphysical theory. This impression is strengthened by a reading of *Creative Evolution*, which leaves one in doubt whether God is to be identified with the vital impulse, and is working up in the course of evolution toward consciousness and freedom; or whether God is to be

regarded as the creator of the vital impulse, and is thus a "creator of creators." There are hints that Bergson believes that his system is capable of a theistic interpretation, but the decisive word as to the real quality of his theism is scarcely to be found within his *Creative Evolution*. Bergson, we may insist, is not in the position to speak the authoritative word on Finalism, until he makes clearer his ultimate metaphysical view, that is, his view of the nature of God and His relation to the world and to life.

Our second question was whether Bergson's vital impulse was competent to do the work assigned to it, that is to safeguard the interests of time and of free-will. Here again the uncertainties as to the origin of the vital impulse and its relation to matter come back to vex us. With Bergson time alone has primary reality, while the spatial world has only artificial or symbolic existence. Objects in space are merely, says Bergson in a striking phrase, the mirrors of our possible actions. But what of the geologic or astronomical ages before the appearance of life or the rise of intelligence? These treat only of that which is reversible, mechanical, calculable, not of real duration, and so they cannot in the proper sense be real. These ages and their history collapse into chaos. There were then no laws of nature or no cosmos at all, for the categories of intelligence and the laws of nature, we are told, have evolved together as the result of the push of the upward stream of life against the downward stream of matter. There can be no question with Bergson of the "fitness of the environment" in the pre-organic period, nor can we ask with a popular preacher, "When God was filling up his coal bins in Pennsylvania millions of years ago, where were the men who were going to burn that coal? Tell me God does not plan ahead!" For with Bergson, when he is strictly interpreted, there were no chemical properties, no elements,

no coal bins or coal deposits, perhaps no matter at all, before the vital impulse or original impulsion began to work. If it be said that the original impulse was eternal, the difficulty for Bergson would be still more serious, for eternity is his *bête noir* which he has used all his ingenuity to exorcise from his system. Bergson's exposition of time is admirable from a psychological standpoint, but the complaint will be made that he reduces it to so narrow a rôle that it cannot be viewed as the very stuff of reality. It is interesting to notice that a recent critic of Bergson, Professor Pringle-Pattison in his *Idea of God* (1917) complains of his want of balance in his treatment of the past and of the future. In his rejection of finalism and his insistence upon the unpredictability of future action, Bergson has broken the link between the present and the future, and has forgotten "the essentially anticipatory character of conscious action, as purposive, and all that is implied in the causality of the ideal" (p. 377).

Bergson is right in championing the cause of freedom against systems whether naturalistic or monistic that would swallow it up. But the interests of freedom, it may be maintained, are far safer in a universe, where, as the finalist believes, will and purpose are enthroned than in a world controlled by blind, capricious, and unintelligent forces. These interests are safer in such a finalistic world than in a world whose fortunes depend on a mere tendency to act on brute matter, without preconceived objects to be attained, or predetermined grooves to direct activity. Such a mere tendency to act on brute matter, such a blind *vis a tergo*, would not lead out the lines of life into complexity, beauty, spontaneity, and freedom, any more than the force of gravitation would bring down the mountain water to the city dwellings without aqueducts and mains laid for that purpose. Such a general tendency to act without foresight of ends

will in fact be another name for mechanical force or chance, the impotence of which to account for the course of evolution Bergson has so acutely set forth.

The Design Argument is not dead, because the state of opinion in the biological field is not unfavorable to the conclusion that intelligent Purpose is at the heart of the universe; because the study of chemistry and physics leads to a biocentric, and the study of ethics and æsthetics leads to an anthropocentric view of the world; and because no half-way house has as yet been found between the ultimate theories of chance and purpose. It is not likely to die because, in the words of Kant, "it gives life to the study of nature, deriving its own existence from it, and thus constantly acquiring new vigor."

At the beginning of the war faith was tried, and some adopted Mr. Wells' view of a finite God, while others were tempted to believe that history had no meaning, but that progress, to use an expression of Mr. G. B. Shaw, was "an infinite comedy of illusion." There has been happily a change in sentiment, as the moral issues of the struggle and the possible beneficent effects have been more clearly distinguished. We may now be thankful that we are living "in freedom's crowning hour," and that we are able to say,

"I saw the powers of darkness take their flight;
I saw the morning break."

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION

EDWARD FARWELL HAYWARD

CHICOPEE

In the process of world readjustment incident to the war no department of man's life is likely to remain unaffected. Probably the more deeply we go into human nature, the more profound will be the reactions. On the surface the earth will not be the same. The scars which the 'Thirty Years' War left upon Europe have not yet been wholly effaced. Although the World War did not last as long, its far greater intensity and destructive force insure a vaster modification of outward nature. We already begin to see how powerfully government, society, and industry are to be affected. The whole order of life is being subjected to new pressures and set in new directions. The programme of education will have to be rearranged to meet the demands of a young manhood which has been tested ideally and practically as no other has ever been tested. Is it then likely that religion, that last resort of the human spirit, can hope to escape the challenge of the hour? To indicate certain tendencies which are already apparent and to point out the probable changes which they foreshadow — one can hardly hope to do more at this time — is the purpose of this article. It will have to do not merely with the attitude of the popular mind toward religion in general, but more particularly with the demand which it is likely to make upon the Church as the depositary and working instrument of religion.

Undoubtedly religion in the world in the future, as in the past, will continue to be dependent upon the

institution which mediates it to man. The fears or hopes of those who foresee the passing of the Church need not be taken too seriously. Any changes which are to come will best be indicated by reference to the Church, which will register them and give them expression. The Church, like man himself, has three sides, three departments of life — one intellectual, one spiritual, and a third which is merely bodily. Or, to put it another way, the Church is first a dogma, then it is a devotion, and finally it is a discipline. In all of these departments of its life it has been a development, changing from age to age with the evolution of the race. The modification, the growth, however, has been most marked in theology; and today it is possible to see a sort of culmination of the long course of doctrinal reconstruction which has been going on.

For a long time the process had to do with doctrines themselves, substituting new ones for old, or softening the rigors of those which were still retained. Then in New England at least, and measurably in other parts of the country, the change was indicated by the new lack of emphasis upon doctrine, an attitude which might be due to either greater breadth of view or lessening sense of the importance of theology. The significant fact is that through all these changes sectarianism has been little affected. The various denominations still maintain their respective enclosures and the force of their separate appeals. How this can be in the face of the modification and even of the discrediting of doctrine, is puzzling until we come to see the final effects of dogmas long held in common by groups of believers. That which is first held as a subscription, at last becomes a tradition, issuing in a habit of mind and an attitude of life. The creedal foundation still exists. As a corner-stone the dogma underlies the Church, but, like other corner-stones generally, it is buried out of sight. Once it was

much in evidence; today in the increasing multitude of new religions, interests, and demands it is seldom referred to. Once it was a finality, it was held as a fixture; now its relation to the Church's life is fluid, it is held in solution.

Out of the long reference to it as a logical foundation has sprung up at last a condition which we cannot better describe than by calling it atmospheric. This is indeed the last analysis of any common thought or action or life among men, and it may be felt as final in any home, in any school or business place. Habits and convictions which men hold in common issue at last in an atmosphere, to which the average person is far more susceptible than he is to the fine distinctions of dogmatic theology. We now mean more than a scheme of doctrines when we speak of Calvinism or Wesleyanism or Unitarianism; we have in mind a general attitude, a state of feeling, a temperature, in short, a climate of the soul which we find congenial or otherwise to our religious needs. When we enter a church, this atmosphere meets us; when we try to live and work in it, this is the condition which determines whether or not we feel at home. The air which seems native to us, in which we breathe most freely, decides our particular church-adherence far more than any personal understanding of or entering into doctrinal differences.

How many loyal and devoted members of any church-communion would be equal to the task of defining intelligently the dogmatic grounds upon which their loyalty rests? And yet this inability does not seem to affect either the loyalty or the devotion. The dogma still plays its part; it has created the atmosphere which has become the active agent in holding church-adherence. This is the only way that we can account for the startling revulsions which occasionally visit individuals and do so much to disrupt and sadden family life. The Unitarian boy goes away to college; and presently, to the bewilderment

of his parents, announces his intention of studying for the priesthood of the Roman Church. The explanation he would probably offer would be that a study of the doctrines of the Church had induced him to change his belief. The chances are, however, that the aggregate of all the influences which have gone into the making of the Church of Rome met the young impressionable mind in far subtler forms than that of ratiocination at the very doors of the Church itself. The spell was first woven about the spirit, the impulse of conformity was first awakened, and finally justification was sought for the desired step in a study of the doctrines. At the last analysis the Church itself becomes its own best teacher. Pressure of earlier environment does not always determine the type of mind; when it finds the environment which is native to it, the inevitable change becomes not so much a conversion as a reversion; and then the doctrinal readjustment becomes easy. This, to be sure, is not always the path of religious reconstruction, but there is reason to believe that it is by this more unconscious method that most cases of conversion are wrought.

A woman who had been brought up in a Calvinist church in a country town tells of a visit to New York City when she was eighteen years old. As a child she had sat in her pew and swung her feet in protest, although she could hardly have understood, much less reasoned about, what she heard. Being taken to a liberal church in the city, she declared that for the first time she felt the customary tension relax, and realized that she was now at home in a church, a conviction which never afterward left her. All that one service could do for a girl of eighteen would hardly account for such an experience unless it be that the doctrinal foundation of the churches has much more than a merely intellectual effect. At the last analysis we should probably find that church-allegiance is largely a feeling of restfulness, a sense of being

satisfied and at home in one church more than in another. However important we may hold the doctrinal basis of religion to be, we must remember that Christianity began in an impulse of faith and personal loyalty to Jesus which was so enthusiastic and compelling as to need no other justification. This exaltation of spirit, this new sense of security and happiness in the presence of a great spiritual discovery, was not reasoned or intellectualized either by teacher or by disciples. For two hundred years this joyous experience was enough. Then, as the ardor cooled, as the sense of divine nearness began to fade, came the need, which is first indicated in the Epistles to Timothy and Titus, of formulating the faith and basing it solidly on a foundation of dogma. A Christology became necessary only when devotion to Christ had begun to wane. Formal theology then took the place of prophecy. When the regenerative force of a free gospel had spent itself, there was nothing to do but to create the institution and buttress the Church upon doctrinal finality. But as time went on the burden of this fixity became increasingly unbearable, until in our own day we have seen the whole doctrinal structure undermined by either denial or indifference. This process seems likely to be accentuated by the war. The readjustment which is coming everywhere is emphasizing a new demand for simplification of Christian teaching and for unity and co-operation of Christian effort. Everywhere the barriers are being broken down. Men are coming together, learning to live and to die together. Race and nation have ceased to be dividing lines and boundaries. In the light of these new understandings and sympathies, what hope is there for a denominationalism founded upon difference of opinion? That men should differ is as necessary as ever, but the *credo* which divides is becoming more a working formula than a religious test; its divisiveness is only superficial; the deep currents of the religious life run

beneath it, and may have a common spiritual experience in spite of all differences of theological belief.

As the growing things of the earth obscure the soil from which they spring, so the obtrusion of doctrinal sources may mean the disturbance of vital processes of religious life. It will always be the business of the Church to condition religious emotion on the right sort of thinking; but the theology itself is not as important as the emotions it helps to create. Its final expression is an attitude and spirit. "When all theological systems have been reduced to a condition of fluidity and flux," writes Professor Andrew McPhail, "a universal church will formulate itself and all men will be drawn unto it for the sheer enjoyment of losing themselves in the Infinite. By the contemplation of heavenly things the transitory and perishable will seem of less importance than they now appear to be; and men will turn from them with hatred and full purpose to endeavor after a new obedience."

This sense of the transitory and perishable in much that passes for religion has been deepening in these days when the foundations of the earth are being broken up, and thought of serious things has begun to disturb our materialistic self-complacency. Much more has been happening than the bombardment of sacred cathedrals in the war which is bringing every dependence of the human spirit to the testing. More than even a new theology we need a new kind of theology, a theology which exists as a fertile soil for the genuine fruits of the spirit, a theology which shall bring all men together in a working brotherhood, however far apart they may be in their thinking. The best part of any dogma ought to be what it can do for those who cannot wholly accept it. There is enough of the Ritualist or the Puritan or the Liberal in religion in us all to make us glad and grateful for the churches which these represent, and even to allow us to profit by

their ministrations on occasion, if only they will have it so. The ideal mother is one who cares for her own, but is loved also by all the boys of the neighborhood, who feels an interest in all, and makes them all share in her motherhood. Mother Church is to become a neighborly and not merely a domestic reality. A boy does not think less of his own parents and his own home because he shares the kind offices of other boys' parents and homes. The very width and variety of these larger religious relationships is necessary to realize the ideal of motherliness in the Church. Nor does dogma offer any obstruction when we accept Professor Francis G. Peabody's definition of faith as a matter of consecration rather than of conformity, as a way of walking rather than a way of talking — "*we walk by faith.*" The stress of great undertakings, the common sufferings and dangers which are welding men of different creeds and nationalities together, are preparing the way for this broad inclusiveness, this sense of an underlying brotherhood in all the differing sentiments of sects. The young men who are coming back from the war are bringing this new point of view with them. We read of the devout Catholic taking part in the Communion service in a Y. M. C. A. tent, and of the Protestant mingling with the Catholic soldiers at mass, of rabbi, priest, and minister indiscriminately sharing the offices for the dead upon the battlefield. Can any one doubt that this is to have effect in the years to come, even if the old lines of church-cleavage still hold? The attitude and spirit of Liberal religion are vindicating themselves to the world; and the question naturally comes, Why, with this immediate advantage, the Liberal Christian church may not more and more come to meet the religious needs of men? What better indication for the future could there be than a religious fellowship which holds its doctrinal contribution as only a part, and not the whole, of Christian teaching, and

which regards doctrine in general as a working method in religion rather than as a test of truth? If it were a question of theology only, the answer might be more easily reached. In the adjustments of the future, however, two other elements will have to be reckoned with — the element of worship and the element of discipline. Though it may *rest* securely on its doctrinal foundations, a church cannot work successfully, above all, it cannot advance and conquer, without a spirit to sustain it and a form to hold it together.

These last two demands of a working church have not been adequately met thus far by religious Liberalism. If, for instance, we take Unitarianism as an example, we find that on the side of worship it has not shown an emotional expression which corresponds with the strength and clarity of its thought. That it has in it the possibility of a deep spiritual experience is evidenced by its output of hymns which have been adopted into the hymnals of all the churches of Christendom, and which are acknowledged by all to have a peculiar depth and singing quality. The Roman Catholic, when he sings "Nearer, my God, to Thee," forgets its Unitarian origin, as does the Evangelical when he clinches his denunciation of Liberalism by using "In the Cross of Christ I glory," both Unitarian hymns. And yet, in spite of this individual expression, the fact remains that collectively the Unitarian Church has not yet evolved a devotional life which is at all comparable with its rational power. Its services have tended to be bare, and its hold upon its followers slight. To have clarified theology and to have enriched hymnology apparently is not enough. Something more is needed than merely to come together to reason about the things of the spirit. That which a true thinking about religion has liberated in the heart ought to have set the people to singing and to have created a worship which is both satisfying and compelling. A church must

first believe; it then must worship and work. Its truth has not fully come to power until it has been caught up into the surroundings, the forms, the expressions, which make it alive and operative. Its convictions must first convict itself before they can hope to convince others. Afraid as it is tempted to be of emotion, and suspicious as it is bound to be of discipline, the Unitarian Church has yet to face the fact that its characteristic differences have to do with only the bases of religion. The content of an effective working religion is always and everywhere the same. It must first and last *move* people; and the pathway of the motive is emotive. Without emotional power it will be feeble and aborted. The only question is, What kind of an emotion; by what law, from what foundation, does it proceed?

This is the great task of the free spirit everywhere, in civil and political as well as in religious life. Can the free spirit in man be depended on to foster the ideals which create the discipline of a true democracy? That spirit has been learning that it moves more freely as well as more effectively within the limits of self-restraint and corporate responsibility imposed from within; and will not the church have to share with the camp and the corporation the new insight? If liberalism in religion, with all its splendid fearlessness in thinking, with all its devotional depth in the individual, remains barren in concrete emotional expression and in responsible church loyalty, it cannot hope to inherit the future. A mere platform or forum for the discussion of God, duty, and destiny is not a church. A church is a worshipping body, and not a spirit merely which is detached and diffusive. With Unitarian character as good as it is, it would seem to be almost a crime to narrow or restrict the appeal which it makes. An active principle of goodness, thoroughly alert and benignly aggressive, spreading a contagion of gladness and service and hope through the world, would

seem to be the natural outcome of the individual health of mind and soul which underlies this church fellowship. What we actually find is that the instrument is neglected; the tree stands brave and beautiful, but it bears scanty fruits. Its success in segregated individuals, which is real, becomes relatively a failure through inability to organize its resources and to function widely.

The next step for the Church is to pass from the Higher Criticism, which has too long engaged its attention, to the Higher Creation which is now possible. Already a High Church party appears among the Unitarians, demanding a new appreciation of worship and a deepening of regard for the institution of religion itself. Admitting that the Church must be free, conceding the honorable place which intellect has in its councils, these younger men are pleading for beauty of expression, for a worship which is not only adequate, but which may be common to all. Reason is divisive. There can be no perfect unity, and hence little organic effectiveness, in the head. It is the heart which binds men together. In deeper feeling, in closer union, in that fuller symbolism which helps to create the one, and in that organization which helps to promote the other, lies the hope of the Church.

Whether or not this new party is to dominate the future of the Unitarian Church remains to be seen, but at least its rise at this time is significant. Especially is it significant in the fearlessness of its announcements and the fullness of its claims. Without surrendering any of the fruits of the age-long struggle for liberty of conscience, without any disparagement of the intellect or any lessening of respect for individualism, this party is prepared to go far in its demand for what it feels is a richer, fuller life. At a conference recently held in the Unitarian church in Birmingham, England, an attempt was made to crystallize this sentiment into action. The

purpose of the conference was to see if ways could not be devised for "reconciling the principles of individual and congregational liberty developed among the free churches with all that is essential to the life, faith, worship, and order of the Catholic (*i.e.*, the older, ritualistic) church." Sympathetic with this movement in England for a fuller liturgy and a more effective life, there is another in this country which is meditating innovations even more extreme. All of its members are committed to the idea of catholicity, and some of them go so far as seriously to consider the restoration, at least in modified form, of the mass.

Whatever may be one's personal attitude toward these proposals, there can be no question that the present order, or lack of order, is being challenged with demands which will somehow have to be met. It is a soldier, actually at the front in France, who takes us a step farther and who sees a "practical" Christianity only where the emphasis is laid on discipline. It may well be doubted if beauty of worship, important as it is, is our greatest need today. Certainly the emphasis on worship is sorely needed, but what is needed more is a rehabilitation of conscience which shall bring a new authority and a new obedience. "What would happen," writes this soldier, a Frenchman, "if we engaged in continual speculations regarding our military duties? As soldiers our task is to use our entire efforts in performing them. It is the same with our Christian duties; this is not the time for discussion but for prayer." The fact is that it is the emphasis on the institution of religion which leads naturally to the enrichment of its services, and which also tends to lend a greater sanction and authority to the Church. Spirit *and* discipline make up an army. They make up a church too. A spiritually-minded man is indeed spiritual in all his *ways*. He does not imagine that he is spiritual only when he thinks, or only when

he obeys the moral law out in the world. One of the *ways* of the Spirit, as well as one of the great Highways of life, is the practice of religion. To observe the laws of the Church, to obey its command, is to get that enlargement, that blessing of obedience to a Divine Government, which our young men are learning to get from obedience to a civil government.

Many things have been made clear to us in the years of our great world-testing, not the least of which is the modern need of a new imperative. To enthrone the categorical imperative of Kant in a church as unfettered as the free spirit in man, would be to do what has been done by American Democracy in the hour of its great trial. Freedom politically has shown itself capable of discipline. The Church, to be effective, must find the way to a new sense of responsibility, a new obedience. Individualism has undreamed-of potentialities, once the spirit is deeply aroused and the right sort of public opinion is created. In the war our citizenry has risen to a new civic consciousness which has supplied the needed compulsions. A national conscience has been born, and that too at a time when the individual conscience was supposed to have weakened. Probably never in the history of the world has so colossal and so splendid a moral awakening ever been witnessed. The Church did not create it directly, but it came out of the depths which the Church has been preparing through all the years of its history. It was the new civic consciousness, the new public opinion, which called the new sense of responsibility into being.

The rehabilitation of conscience, not the reconstruction of theology, and not the beautifying of worship merely, is the greatest need of the Church today. To say that men are neglectful of religious duty because doctrine does not square with reason and science, or because the services of the Church are bare and unin-

viting, is superficial. These are good excuses; the real reason is that conscience has broken down, that in the distractions of life and the growing assumption of individual initiative and accountability by corporate action everywhere, the power of the Ought has weakened in the souls of men. Gradually men have come to feel about the Church as they have felt about the State, that they would get what they could from it in their hour of need and give to it as little as possible. Any attempts at moral militancy on its part, any assertion of claims upon its world constituency, are resented. And yet the possibilities of a new discipline are as latent in the Church as they have proved to be in the State; only the compulsions must come here also from within. They must develop from the new spirit, the new conscience, which an unfettered, democratic Church is best fitted to create.

Conscience — and yet what has the world not suffered in that sacred name! And how without prayer and fasting shall one dare to invoke that symbol by which humanity has been so often obstructed and enslaved? In the light of past experience it is not strange that men are reluctant to give obedience to religious authority, so much of the sin and indifference of men is to be laid at the door of this principle falsely applied. But the lesson of history must be relearned, and conscience must be seen in a new light. Leaving all the learned definitions, why not identify it simply with the sense of responsibility and give it the larger implications of social duty? Conscience which has indeed made cowards of us all, yes, and worse than cowards, community-slackers, social obstructors, must be taken from its narrower, personal definition and restated as the principle which conditions not only any common life, but also any individual development which is adequate to the needs of life. *My* conscience is what one so often hears about,

the *my* bulking larger in the mind of the Protestant than the conscience itself. Mark the perfect man, we are admonished, and behold the upright. But if in his effort to stand straight he leans so far as to fall backward, it will be difficult to mark his perfections, and obviously he cannot, when so prostrate, be called upright. The point to be noted is that unless one is first *up-right* he cannot hope to become *up-right*; so that the conscientious objector and the conscienceless rejector come out finally at the same place.

What we need is a new religious conscience to match the new civic, the new social, conscience which has of late found expression among us. Can the Church create this out of its own deepened life? Turning away from its disputations, and subordinating all forms of prettiness, can it concentrate all its energies upon the moral call to arms, upon the thought of service, not of itself, not even of others merely, but of that loyalty and devotion to religion itself, the higher, the more essential and enduring patriotism, which is presented to us consistently in the form and order of the living Church? Especially can the liberal church, free and unfettered, that democratic flower of the spirit, do this? If it can, there is hope for it and for humanity. It will be more difficult for any other to rise to the demand of the hour. The age is suffering for want of a new consciousness of God, and a new realization of His exigency in human affairs. God must be allowed to speak within us, as He spake of old, and the Voice must come to us objectively. Till conscience is enthroned again, it is useless to reconstruct theology or to enrich worship or to revive religion. The root of the matter resides in the will. A new motivation of religion is the crying need of the hour.

BOOK REVIEWS

PLATONISM. PAUL ELMER MORE. Princeton University Press. 1917.
Pp. ix, 307. \$1.75.

This book will claim attention from a wide circle of readers, not only for the interest which all thinking men have in Platonism, the most pregnant product of ancient Greek thought, but also because the present volume comes from one of our foremost American critics, whose past studies, literary and philosophic, have ranged from ancient India and Greece to the present time and place. Therefore we turn to this interpretation of the elusive master with happy anticipations, eager to see what Plato's thought may mean to a non-professional scholar, for we know that such may sometimes give a fairer and more edifying interpretation than the professional, whose thought may have been confined within too narrow bounds. And it should be stated here at the outset that Dr. More does not disappoint us. He knows the Platonic dialogues well, and, in spite of a few slips in interpretation, we may add that he knows them accurately. Naturally many will differ from him on this point or on that, but such differences are inevitable when we are dealing with a writer like Plato, whose dialogues are graceful, suggestive, and alluring, not formal, schematic, and final. Happily Plato's quest for the truth was never ended, and therefore we have no definitive Platonic system. Every interpretation must be partial; every interpreter, as Dr. More aptly says, "has no other measure than his own capacity."

The nine chapters of this volume are made up from five lectures delivered at Princeton University in October and November, 1917, on the Vanuxem Foundation, with the addition of much material which could not be included in the oral presentation. Little is said of Plato's views on education, art, and politics, but the attention is centred on Plato's ethical theme. This subject involves a discussion of the aims of Socrates, of the relation of Plato to his master, of Plato's doctrine of ideas, his science and cosmogony, and finally of his metaphysics. In an appendix Dr. More summarizes in useful fashion his own ideas as to the proper sequence of Plato's works. It is perhaps ungracious, where so much is given, to regret that we have

not more; but the reviewer cannot help feeling that if the author had sketched the political, social, and intellectual environment in which Plato grew up, and had thus given him his historical background, the present book would have gained in value; for exalted as Plato now appears to us, and great as he was in his own day, he was nevertheless the child — the noblest child, we shall gladly grant — of his time, and his philosophy becomes the more intelligible as we understand the factors of which it was composed and the conditions which stimulated him to construct it.

Dr. More begins his work with a discussion of the three "Socratic theses," the three impulses which, to our author's mind, carried Socrates toward philosophy. These he defines as follows: "an intellectual scepticism, a spiritual affirmation, and a tenacious belief in the identity of virtue and knowledge." The scepticism of Socrates is shown to have been no merely negative doubt as to the possibility of truth and reality, such as it was in the case of Pyrrho and others — whom we must recognize, nevertheless, as not wholly illegitimate children of Socratic teaching; but it was rather an intellectual habit of examining all things, that by examination the seeker might arrive at clearer and more positive notions. It is true that at first sight there seems to be much in common between the Socratic "scepticism" and the Sophistic doctrine of relativity; but the latter led to negative results, while the former, if often in the Platonic dialogues it reaches no conclusion, is always aiming at positive ends — at the attainment of concepts of universal validity, and at the elevation of human life. To his passion for inquiry Socrates added a faith in the validity of his intuitions concerning morality and religion; and when Plato's reader is impatient with Socrates' tantalizing failure to draw the conclusions which he desires, he is still bound to remember that Socrates was positive-minded; that however much pleasure this vexer of men's complacency might apparently have in showing up his subject's ignorance and in confessing his own, there were fundamental matters on which he had no doubts; nor did any arise in his mind when at the crisis of his life he faced his judges; for although he cheerfully confessed that he did not know whether the death he was facing might not prove a blessing instead of a misfortune, he boldly affirmed that he did know that it was an evil and a shameful thing to do wrong and to disobey one's superior, whether god or man; and that therefore he would never be afraid of things which might prove in the end to be good, nor would he ever flee from such rather than from the evils which he knew were evils and nothing else (*Apol.* 29 B).

Again the positive character of the Socratic quest appears in the thesis which Dr. More defines as "a belief in the identity of virtue and knowledge." At first hearing this sounds like a mere paradox, but due consideration of the evidence proves that Socrates held knowledge in the moral field to be that certainty which is attained by reasoning on the pleasures and pains of life. When a man rationalizes the springs of conduct by weighing the near and remote consequences of his acts, he is in a fair way to acquire prudence in action, that is, to be virtuous. If we willingly grant that this is utilitarianism, we shall also maintain that it is a rationalized and ennobled utilitarianism. After all, was not philosophy from Socrates' day largely *ars vivendi*, which is equivalent to saying that it was ethical? Utilitarian need not always be an adjective of condemnation.

The inconsistency between this utilitarian thesis and the Socratic scepticism and spiritual intuition is one which Dr. More wisely does not attempt to overlook or brush aside, and he makes a timely protest against letting the rationalistic Socrates overshadow the sceptical searcher and the religious intuitionist. Gomperz at one extreme has reduced Socrates to the rank of a rationalistic teacher of the unity of virtue and knowledge; Burnet at the other extreme would attribute to Socrates most of Plato's philosophy. Dr. More steers a middle course and restores to us an historic Socrates, a human being, who stirred both the minds and the emotions of those who listened to him. Systems he left for his followers to develop.

By the "Platonic Quest" Dr. More understands a development of the spiritual affirmation and the belief in the identity of virtue and knowledge which was marked in Socrates' thought and teaching; Plato gives a rational justification to this belief, and so proves that virtue and happiness are inseparable. That justification is the theme of the chapter in which Dr. More discusses many important parts of the *Republic*. In his treatment of the different forms of the State there are occasionally points at which we might note exceptions, but in general the discussion is accurate and illuminating. Plato's aim in his great dialogue is clearly shown to be the profound commonplace, approved by the common sense of mankind, that justice alone secures happiness and that injustice inevitably dooms man to misery. Thus Plato by his arguments justifies the affirmation of the spirit before reason, and shows himself content to rest on the knowledge thus secured as the principle of life.

Such a conclusion as this depends, of course, on Plato's (or was it Socrates'?) sharp distinction between knowledge and opinion, happiness and pleasure. Whether it is not somewhat confusing to call

the recognition of these distinctions a dualism may be questioned, for this is a term of such wide applicability (*cf.* p. 123) that it tempts us to overwork it. Again we might complain with a certain justice that in his chapter on Plato's psychology Dr. More sometimes uses inexactly modern equivalents for the faculties and functions of Plato's tripartite $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$; and again perhaps he attributes to Plato a clearer concept of the unity of personality than the dialogues warrant.

The Platonic "ideas" Dr. More divides into two main categories, the rational and the ethical. In the first are included mathematical forms, genera or species of natural things, or of manufactured objects (the square or cube, man or horse, table or chair); in the latter category we must place such ideas as justice, virtue, *et cetera*. The abstract ideas, as we call them, which deal with ethics, were in all probability Plato's first and main interest (p. 171); that is to say, he was brought to his doctrine by ethical rather than by logical considerations. Dr. More could well have quoted Aristotle (*Meta.* 987 b) in partial support of his views, although to the reviewer's mind a strong argument can be made for the opposite contention. Be that as it may, Plato clearly held in his maturity to both ethical ideas and ideas of natural classes and of manufactured objects, and maintained that all the ideas had existence anterior to the individual objects and exterior to the human mind; in other words, that reality was found only in the ideas. Thus Plato secured a firm foundation for his ethical system by finding virtue's warrant in the immutable reality of the ideas. Moreover, he frequently treats the ideas of beauty, justice, and righteousness as intimately united, and thus intentionally, or unwittingly, confuses æsthetics and ethics. But from this confusion, whatever its cause, Plato secures for the individual a great impulse towards goodness, for by the contemplation of ideal beauty one is drawn to love the idea of goodness, and so to become good himself.

When Dr. More explains the true Platonic ideas (p. 182) as the "imaginative projections of the facts of moral consciousness," one is tempted to question whether he is not attributing to Plato a conscious process which hardly belonged to him. The development of the doctrine of ideas or forms had a long history before Plato, and it seems not improbable that his predecessors, *e.g.*, the Pythagoreans, as well as Plato himself, arrived at their notions by intuitive bounds fully as much as by inductive processes. Perhaps this is what Dr. More means by his expression "imaginative projections"; if so, the reviewer must plead guilty to dullness of apprehension.

Space requires us to discuss briefly the chapter on Science and Cosmogony. By Plato's Science Dr. More means intellectual dialectic which deals with things of time and space, and which attempts to determine the reality behind the individual phenomena. By a discussion of parts of the *Republic*, involving the familiar distinction between opinion and knowledge, and the curricula of studies for the ideal State, he comes to his conclusion that, in Plato's view, the value of Science lay in the training which it furnished for the true philosophic life; that is to say, Science is the means of the soul's ascent. The treatment of Science leads inevitably to the *Timæus*, in which the story of creation is set forth, not clearly—for the course was hardly clear to Plato—but with a constant recognition of the presence in the cosmos of two factors—the divine element and brute necessity. The former works in the higher sphere, and is now thought of as the supreme Ideal or, more personally, as God; the other element, Necessity, *ἀνάγκη*, in the *Timæus* corresponds in general to the Infinite or the Unlimited, *τὸ ἄπειρον*, of the *Philebus*. This is the substratum from which the Demiurge and his subordinates create the sensible world. The understanding of Plato's concept of Necessity, *ἀνάγκη*, Dr. More would make the touchstone to determine the true Platonist. He defines it as "the resistance of the meaningless and incomprehensible flux of things, whether in nature or the human soul, to the government of order and happiness." But as Goodness is at once the motive and the end of God's action, which introduces order into the formless and disordered substratum, therefore the divine Reason orders the world toward Goodness, in so far as Necessity allows. Thus Plato's cosmogony is teleological.

In his chapter on Metaphysics, Dr. More discusses the puzzling problem of the *Parmenides*. He reviews the many types of interpretation which the past century has brought forth, and rejects them all; but he stands closest to Gomperz. With him Dr. More agrees that the attack on every form of doctrine of Ideas is conducted with relentless logic and rigor. What then are we to say of Plato's obstinate adherence to the doctrine which logic has demolished? Dr. More replies that Plato accepts "the reality of Ideas as a necessity of inner experience" so cogent that the assaults of logic cannot shake our faith in them. Viewed thus, the dialogue becomes a defense of Plato's system.

Finally, in his conclusion, Dr. More acutely deals with the influence of Platonism, especially of Platonism misunderstood, in religion and philosophy, devoting most attention to the English Platonists. His exposition of the relation between romanticism and the

perverted doctrine of Plato is interesting and important. The test for him of the long line of pseudo-Platonists is that they lay hold of all the "imaginative and emotional elements of Platonism, but forget that the spiritual affirmation speaks from a dark recess of the soul." The true Platonist, on the other hand, knows that the divine spirit, like Socrates' dæmon, always speaks to check and inhibit, never in positive commands; only the false sectary imagines that the spirit bids him follow his desires and so turn liberty into license. If Dr. More is right here, and the reviewer believes that he is, his words deserve the careful consideration of every one who earnestly desires a guide to righteousness.

We have given so much space to this book because we believe that it is one of much importance to the readers of this REVIEW. Although some clergymen appear to feel that they have been called to everything save theology, the one subject which should be the intellectual basis of their calling, still theology remains the queen of the sciences; and no Greek thinker had so much influence on Christian thought as Plato. Therefore we commend to them the study of Dr. More's work.

Yet one curse must be pronounced upon it: *damnentur omnes qui indices omittunt.*

CLIFFORD H. MOORE.

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LIBERAL JUDAISM AND HELLENISM. CLAUDE G. MONTEFIORE. Macmillan & Co. 1918. Pp. xi, 328. 6s.

It is easy to define neither religion nor any organized expression of it. Even orthodoxy is constantly changing. Conservative Judaism is not what it was a century ago, while Mr. Montefiore's Liberal Judaism was then unknown. Jews have no authoritative ecclesiastical body to determine their creed or dictate their conduct, so that while on certain fundamentals all are agreed, Judaism for most of them is a matter of individual interpretation. Hence the warrant for Mr. Montefiore's attempt to define Liberal Judaism. It is not his first essay in this field. What is known as Reform Judaism began in Germany in the early part of the nineteenth century. Today the movement, strong as it is in America, knows little following in Europe. Judaism throughout Europe is most conservative. But Mr. Montefiore for a generation at least has been championing the cause of a liberal interpretation of his faith. In 1903 he published

his *Liberal Judaism*. In a prefatory note he stated that the essay "does not present the views of any existing organization or party, and no one but myself is responsible for any of the statements and opinions which it contains." He might make the same confession of his present volume. Indeed again and again he stresses the fact that neither officially nor unofficially is he the accredited representative or spokesman of any body of Jews. Yet there is no doubt that in many respects he voices the sentiment of a considerable number of his co-religionists.

Scholarly, Mr. Montefiore is profoundly religious. He is an intellectually religious enthusiast. Thoroughly modern, he has profound reverence for the past. He believes wholly in the higher criticism of even sacred literature, but it remains none the less sacred literature to him. He does not deny or attempt to gloss over the faults of the Old Testament, but he argues logically that its weaknesses do not neutralize its strength, that its faith is a matter of evolution, that its value should justly be determined not by its humble beginnings but by its remarkable achievements, its spiritual attainments. And so he finds warrant for his Liberal Judaism in the old Book of Books.

To the New Testament Mr. Montefiore applies the same test he uses with the Old. He makes clear what of the New Testament not even Liberal Judaism can endorse or accept. But he argues that it has much to offer which the Jew would do well seriously to consider. He presents the most reverent estimate of the character of Jesus, though explaining clearly why for ages neither he nor his teachings found favor among the Jews. Much that Jesus taught, the Jews had known before his time. Yet Jesus, he contends, complements Jewish teaching in many ways, and presents it in more intense, more gripping, and therefore more appealing fashion. It is indeed the very intensity, the enthusiasm of Jesus that accounts to us for what we usually term his impracticable idealism. And yet is idealism ever impracticable?

Even Rabbinism can serve the cause of Liberal Judaism. For Judaism has never been static, so that after the Canon was closed the story of the faith was continued. "Rabbinic morality is common-sense morality shot through with idealism." It "smoothed the rough moral and religious edges of the Old Testament." Independently it found some of the development contained in the New Testament.

For the spiritual achievements of Hellenism Mr. Montefiore has the profoundest admiration. "No religion can live in the Western world which has not settled accounts with Hellenism." He traces interestingly the relation between Judaism and Hellenism, shows how Hellen-

ism has indelibly affected Judaism (and Christianity too, for that matter), and urges on his people a more cordial welcome of the finer contributions which Hellas has made to religious thought. Liberal Judaism, he is certain, will not be wanting in this needed hospitality.

For these many reasons, the author holds, Liberal Judaism need not fear the trying times that are upon us. Whatever political, social, industrial changes come to pass, Liberal Judaism will survive. It too will change, will expand, will probably become more liberal, abandoning, it may be, some of the things it now urges, admitting newer truths, newer revelations, but loving always truth, the universal truth, that relates every man, of every faith and land, to God, the truth that will endure and bless.

Mr. Montefiore's appeal for a liberal, spiritual, universal faith, one that will embrace all truth and all men, that will bring God to man and man to God, that will unite men in the common service of God and man, is well-nigh irresistible. And though it may be too eclectic for our denominational day, still it points the way and is bound to serve the cause to which it addresses itself. And especially now, when because of the war, on the one hand, men are asking as to the relation of religion to life, the justification of religion in the face of what has taken place, and on the other, are religiously drawing nearer to each other. Is not this the day for a frank, logical, liberal restatement of religion, call it by whatever name you will?

And so the liberal Jew applauds Mr. Montefiore's message, though where details are concerned he may have to part company with him. It is difficult, for example, to understand why, considering its program, Liberal Judaism, justifying as it does the retention of ceremonies that still have religious significance, should hold fast even for "reasons of a social and juridical order" to rites that no longer have religious or, for that matter, even hygienic warrant (p. 69). Why retain Biblical passages whose message we have completely outgrown? And what right have we to reinterpret them, giving them a meaning we know they were not intended to convey, simply that we may go on using them (p. 68)? Mr. Montefiore is here no more convincing than in his insistence that passages from the New Testament, however beautiful and deeply religious, even when they present a point of view finer than that of the Old Testament, must not be used by Jews: "They belong to another theology, another religion, even to another world of religious thought than ours" (p. 114). True. But how can the liberal Jew of Mr. Montefiore's type harmonize his admiration and enthusiasm for these teachings with his insistence that we who are Jews dare not make use of them?

Mr. Montefiore regrets that the Pirke Aboth is contained in no liberal Jewish ritual. A condensed version is to be found in the Union Prayer Book issued by the Central Conference of American Rabbis. Justly he deplores the fact that so little of Rabbinical literature is accessible to the English-speaking public. The Jewish Publication Society of America is planning now to meet the need. There is a typographical error in the note on p. 86: "Dr. J. Kohler" should read "Dr. K. Kohler."

HARRY LEVI.

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ST. PAUL'S FIGHT FOR GALATIA. C. H. WATKINS. The Pilgrim Press. 1914. Pp. 312.

In this book Dr. Watkins presents to English readers in a somewhat expanded form a thesis that was accepted by the University of Heidelberg for a Doctorate of Theology. (Published in 1913 by Mohr, Tübingen, under the title of *Der Kampf des Paulus um Galatien*.) He speaks in his preface of particular indebtedness to his chief theological teacher, the late Professor Johannes Weiss, to whom, along with Dr. Alexander Souter, sometime Professor in Mansfield College, Oxford, the work is dedicated. It should be stated, however, that while he doubtless owes much to these teachers in the way of stimulus and suggestion, his conclusions are the fruit of his own independent investigation. In not a few instances he has not hesitated to reject as untenable emendations and interpretations that were championed by his Heidelberg preceptor.

The material of the thesis is arranged in three main divisions. Part I deals with The Present Struggle in Galatia (pp. 16-152); Part II with The Previous Stages of the Struggle (pp. 155-260); and Part III with General Observations on the Cogency and Justice of the Epistle, the Personal and Polemical Characteristics of the Apostle manifested therein, and the probable Success of his Efforts (pp. 263-312).

It is the earlier part of the work that will be found of particular interest. The opening chapter deals with the style of Galatians. An effort is made to trace from sentence to sentence the alternations of Paul's emotion resulting from his surprise, disappointment, or chagrin at the threatened ruin of his labor. This psychological analysis is often over-subtle. Paul's emotional fluctuations can hardly have been as abrupt and transitory as is here imagined. Such

an atomistic treatment fails to do sufficient justice to the dominant mood pervading many paragraphs and, to a certain extent, the whole Epistle. Perhaps the most important result that emerges from this study of style is the conclusion that two sets of passages in Galatians must be interpreted with caution. On the one hand, there are verses that are obscure and that may be misleading because they are not calm, and, on the other hand, we come upon utterances that are open to the charge of calculation and bias because they are calm. It accordingly follows that caution must be exercised in employing Galatians as a historical authority. Its statements need at all times to be carefully scrutinized and everywhere one must reckon upon the possible presence of a strong subjective factor. Not alone should account be taken of what the Apostle actually says, but likewise of the kind of influence that he is seeking to exert. This contention of Dr. Watkins, which is advanced in his opening chapter, runs through his entire book. He does not cease to point out that in this Epistle Paul speaks as a controversialist and that all his statements must be understood from such a point of view.

Following the discussion of style there is a chapter on the charges and insinuations brought against the Apostle by his opponents, and an effort is made to recover them in so far as they can be extracted from his own words of defense. A considerable measure of uncertainty will always attach to the results of such a quest, because Paul has not seen fit to deal directly with his critics' accusations, but has chosen rather to refute them by an indirect and allusive method. In this portion of his investigation Dr. Watkins has shown good exegetical judgment. The much discussed passage, Gal. 2 3-5, is interpreted as follows: "Particularly in regard to Titus the demand was made for circumcision, and for that matter I can understand its being made, but from our point of view the proposal was an impossible one, and it failed to be carried."

The third chapter deals with the principles of Paul's gospel and the contrasted positions of his opponents. It is urged that these latter must have been Christian at heart and that, however poorly they may have succeeded in their efforts, they must still be credited with an endeavor to preach Christ. Very likely they had much more in common with the Apostle than might at first appear, and than he himself recognized. His inability to do them full justice might be due in part to his unique spiritual experience, and in some measure to his strong polemic interest on the present occasion. It will not be strange under such circumstances if he is inclined to over-emphasize points of difference.

The second section of the book opens with a new examination of Gal. 1 10-2 16; the aim being this time to discover the real facts of the historical situation and to ascertain whether they are always correctly set forth by Paul. At several points it is concluded that he has hardly done justice to the past, but that he has rather imposed upon it an interpretation which suits his present purpose. For example, at the conference in Jerusalem he probably "recognized the authority of the senior Apostles in a more thorough-going fashion than one would suppose from a hasty reading of the verse (2 6) as it now stands." It is the refusal to recognize the authority of these teachers now that leads him to deny it more decisively for a former time.

When Dr. Watkins comes to take up Acts he confines his discussion largely to chapter 15, which he believes deals with the same events that are recounted in Galatians 2. Paul's earlier visit to Jerusalem, spoken of in Acts 11 27-30, was doubtless so unconnected with the topics of Galatians that it could be altogether passed by. A special section in defense of this position and in reply to his critics and reviewers has been added by Dr. Watkins to the English edition of his book.

The Apostolic Decree (Acts 15 19, 20) is interpreted as a proclamation of Gentile freedom. Its primary purpose was not, as is so often erroneously supposed, to impose restrictions, but rather to repeal circumcision and other legalities. When the matter is so construed, it is possible to "reach the important conclusion that there is no sharp contrast between the Epistle and the Acts. According to both, the essential thing in the Jerusalem agreement is the liberation of the Gentile Christians from the Law, especially as incarnated in circumcision." While such a decree might conceivably come as a sequel to the strife in Antioch, Dr. Watkins holds that on the whole it is best assigned to the Council at Jerusalem. To this same time may belong a discussion of the question of common meals for Jewish and Gentile Christians, and an effort may have been made to establish a working agreement. Against such a background of compromise we can best understand the controversy in Antioch. In this wise Dr. Watkins believes that Acts and Galatians can be made to criticize and supplement each other. There are, however, probably few who will follow him in this conclusion.

The third part of the book is given over largely to an examination of Paul's personal and polemical characteristics as revealed in the Epistles. We are admonished anew that a recognition of his devotion and of his many noble qualities should not lead us to forget

that in this letter he is a controversialist, the leader of one side only in the dispute. "It was what he himself on this occasion intended to be."

As might be anticipated from a perusal of the chapter-headings, there is in Dr. Watkins' book a considerable measure of repetition, but it always seems to serve some good purpose. At times the English style leaves something to be desired, possibly because it does not altogether escape the hampering influence of the German original. Of the typographical errors the most disturbing is the substitution of Timothy for Titus on page 124. Of the book as a whole, apart from its detailed conclusions, it may be said that it brings a valuable contribution to the interpretation of Galatians. It emphasizes as has not been done before that the Epistle is essentially an emergency-writing, both as regards its form and its content. In depicting Paul as a controversialist the writer has had much greater success than he has in harmonizing Acts and Galatians.

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THE COURSE OF CHRISTIAN HISTORY. W. J. MCGLOTHLIN. The Macmillan Co. 1918. Pp. iv, 323. \$2.00.

Ten years ago Professor McGlothlin of the Southern Baptist Seminary published a *Guide to the Study of Church History* which was really only a syllabus of topics, well arranged, with continuous references to a few standard textbooks and collections. Now he has expanded this syllabus by giving it a more narrative form and adding sixty pages of Questions and Topics to the two hundred and fifty pages of his text. The bibliography has also been enlarged, but is still slight and casual. The author's purpose, to promote the study of Church History in colleges, is commendable, but his method is more adapted to the infant class than to students of collegiate grade.

THE ACÁTHIST HYMN OF THE HOLY ORTHODOX EASTERN CHURCH. In the original Greek text, and done into English verse. Edited by W. J. BIRKBECK and G. R. WOODWARD. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1917. Pp. viii, 62. \$1.25.

The late W. J. Birkbeck, well known for his studies on the Russian Church, had planned this new edition of the Acáthist Hymn, which reproduces the liturgical text, as contained in the *Great Horologion*

(Venice, 1892: pp. 421-437). The Acáthist Hymn (so called because it is read or sung *none sitting*) was first recited in honor of the Virgin Mary for the repulse of the Hagarenes from Constantinople in the reign of Heraclius (A.D. 626). Generally it is attributed to Sergius, poet-patriarch of Constantinople (610-641). The English translation, which is due to Mr. G. R. Woodward, is on the whole faithful to the Greek text, although sometimes it amplifies unduly the original thought of the Byzantine poet.

THE LIFE OF ST. FRANCIS XAVIER, EVANGELIST, EXPLORER, MYSTIC.
EDITH ANNE STEWART. With translations from his letters by DAVID
MACDONALD, B.D. Headley Bros., London. 1917. Pp. 356. Eleven
portraits, maps. 12s. 6d.

The nineteen chapters into which the life of St. Francis is divided are arranged in a strictly chronological order. The preliminary chapters are an interesting review of the antecedents of St. Francis, national, domestic, and educational. Chapters IV and V deal at some length with the order of the Jesuits and especially with the religious charter of the Jesuits, the Spiritual Exercises. All this is legitimate arrangement, for Xavier next to Ignatius Loyola was the Jesuit and the Spaniard of primary importance. The following chapters confine themselves almost exclusively to Francis. They recount his labors in Italy and at Lisbon, the journey from Lisbon to Goa, to Cape Comorin, to Ceylon, Japan, and back to India again, and they end with the untimely death of Francis.

The book is useful; it is carefully done; it reveals the author's love of her subject; it manifests familiarity with the principal sources and with the modern literature on the subject (in fact the author should be especially commended for the admirable bibliography in the appendix). But to the reviewer at least it fails to convey with power the fascination of the Saint himself. The parts that appeal to me most strongly are those relating to Ignatius and the order of Jesuits rather than those pertaining directly to St. Francis. It would be difficult to draw a picture so winning that the reader's attention would be impatient with all that did not intimately relate itself to the subject. But this is precisely what the author should do. Xavier was a great man — in some ways greater than Ignatius. He was not only a remarkable personality, but he was intimately associated with events of a religious, sociological, intellectual, and geographical importance inferior to none in

early modern days. The author tells us all these things, but she does not make them matters of commanding importance. She does not make one regret that the last page of the book has been reached. In fact she inserts others and herself a little too much, and, save here and there, she does not let Francis stand forth clearly as he is.

Wherever the author allows Francis perfect freedom, the book is of real value. There are translations of many letters, a good proportion of which are to Ignatius Loyola. To me these are the best portions of the book. The author has done a real service in producing them in such convenient form. There are descriptions of the horrors of a sixteenth-century voyage and of the attempts of Francis to alleviate the sufferings of his fellow-passengers; there are accounts of foreign lands and strange peoples, all in Francis' own words; there are directions by him as to the proper nurture of heathen peoples in the Christian faith — very rudimentary, very crude, but very effective. These are of a value second only to that of the letters to his master. But there should have been more of these. The letters of Francis are a mine of religious, pedagogical, and ethnical information. He was intimately associated with the creative days of Portuguese Colonial power. The book just misses the effective assertion of this fact. Another edition should have more of Francis and less of his times and his contemporaries. He should be allowed to speak more, and there should be less running comment on what he says. These remarks are possibly a council of perfection. They may be hypercritical. But one always wants to see a good book made a little better.

HENRY B. WASHBURN.

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WHAT IS CHRISTIANITY? A STUDY OF RIVAL INTERPRETATIONS. GEORGE CROSS. University of Chicago Press. 1918. Pp. x, 214. \$1.00.

In this little book, written in clear, simple style, the author gives us an introductory section of his apologetics; that is, he presents discussions "preparatory to a statement and vindication of the truth of the Christian religion." This being his task, the plan of his work is of much interest and importance. The plan adopted by Professor Cross is that of delineating six rival types of Christianity, and then presenting in a concluding chapter his conception of the essence of Christianity. The interest and importance of the plan are that it provides a way of organizing the manifold and complex

results of the scientific study of Christianity so that their meaning for the life of today may be grasped and interpreted. Not one stereotyped form, but a number of relatively plastic types, each possessing certain values and certain limitations, is what Christianity offers to the modern world, in the judgment of the author; and even in his definition of the essence of Christianity he does not seek fixity of traits, but regards growth and variety as permanently normal characteristics.

So useful is this method that one feels impelled to wish that it might be developed a little further. The problem, not wholly solved in this book, is to utilize the phases of historical development in order to throw light upon the present situation without confusing successive stages of development in the past with types that rival each other in the present. The point may be illustrated in the case of two of the author's six types — Apocalypticism and Protestantism. Apocalypticism is treated as *the* type of pre-Catholic Christianity; the consequence is that one of the most significant facts for present Christianity — the existence of several great types of Christian experience in the New Testament itself — is largely obscured. And at the same time little is said of the pre-millenarianism of today. Again, when Protestantism is placed as a type alongside of such others as Evangelicism or modernized Protestant Christianity, Rationalism, and Mysticism, it evidently is being presented chiefly as a stage of historic development — the portion of Protestantism which today rivals Mysticism, Rationalism, and modernized Protestantism being left undefined. A remedy for the difficulty here pointed out might be secured by drawing more upon the psychology of religion, along with the history of Christianity, in the defining of types, and by making it more clear that the ideas of first importance for apologetics and theology are those which bear upon the present and the immediate future — where control or guidance may be exercised.

The characterization in brief compass of types which include a great mass of historic material is interestingly and skilfully carried out. Apocalypticism is placed in the framework of general Oriental mythology. "Jewish Apocalypticism is a modification, under the influence of the Jewish religious spirit, of a widespread, if not universal, Oriental philosophy of the universe and of human life." One is surprised, however, by the judgment that Apocalypticism was "the very flower of prophetism." Surely it is not the apocalyptic literature, but the prophetic, which means the most to the world. The treatment of Catholicism as a type of Christianity — normal on the basis of a certain philosophy of the universe and history and morals — is

a great gain over regarding it as Antichrist or as a mass of superstition. Mysticism is presented as having been of great historic value, but as possessing too little socially constructive capacity for our age. Protestantism is characterized with enthusiasm, fulness, and discrimination. "The three great mountain peaks of the Protestant religious consciousness" are said to be, "loyalty to a personal God, confidence in the orderly course of the universe, and the sense of inner worth." If, however, Protestantism and "modernized Protestant Christianity" are to be presented as two different types, one is inclined to feel that such a characterization should be applied to the latter type rather than to the former. Rationalism is treated appreciatively, but is judged to be "ultimately aristocratic." Evangelicism, or modernized Protestant Christianity, is described as a new type of Christian life and thought. Among the forces mentioned as producing it are, the eighteenth-century religious revival, the development of popular education, economic progress, democracy, the achievements of science, the historical and psychological points of view. The author's discussion of this type suggests interesting questions. Can a new type of Christianity be said to have already emerged, or is its emergence largely a matter of the future? May not Evangelicism, as the author conceives it, contain too diverse elements — involving too much inner tension — to permit of its functioning as a unified type?

The point of view from which Professor Cross discusses his final theme, "What then is Christianity," is admirable. He does not intend here "just one more attempt to reduce our religion to its ultimate and irreducible essence." He aims rather at "suggesting lines of further development" for those characteristics of Christianity which he finds most vital now. "Christianity," he says, "is nothing if it be not ceaselessly creative of the new." (This, of course, is true, not historically, but from the standpoint of the author's apologetics.) "The ideally true Christianity, the Christianity that can actually be the religion of all men and bring all men to the perfect man, lies yet in the future." From this point of view the author presents as permanent features of Christianity, the aim at wholeness of spiritual life; the experiencing of a Higher Being through the realization of this aim; the normative significance of Jesus for the determining of what wholeness of spiritual life is; "the practice of the most perfect human fellowship"; the intimate blending of worship and morality; the capacity for securing moral redemption; the capacity for giving men perfect peace. With regard to this fine closing chapter one major query arises. Is sufficient prominence given to the thorough-

going social character which the Christianity of the future promises to possess?

Considered as a whole, this book seems to be well adapted for popular use and at the same time to contain much that is suggestive for the professional student. It gives good promise for the future work in the theology of evangelicism in which the author plans to discuss the manner in which we should undertake "to reconstruct the expression of the eternal realities of the Christian faith."

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HUMAN NATURE AND ITS REMAKING. W. E. HOCKING. Yale University Press. 1918. Pp. xxviii, 434. \$3.00.

By *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, published in 1912, Dr. Hocking put us heavily in his debt, and this new book has added to the obligation. In some respects it is better than its predecessor. The style is as flexible as ever, but of closer weave. There are as many allusive vistas of thought, but they less frequently divert a reader's attention from the main line of the argument. It is bright, brilliant in spots (sometimes almost too brilliant for perfect lucidity), but it never trembles on the edge of flashiness. If one wishes the author were more restrained, he but compliments him on having much to restrain.

The substance of the book was given at Yale in 1916 in a course of lectures on the Nathaniel W. Taylor Foundation. Appropriately therefore in view of the dominating interest of Professor Taylor, it deals essentially with the theological subjects of sin and salvation, but the difference in the formulation of the problem, as well as in its solution, marks a century of religious progress. One is pleasantly reminded now and then of Yale's great theologian, as the sight of an old-fashioned warming-pan hanging in the chamber hallway of a steam-heated house recalls the ways of our ancestors; but the whole context of the discussion is different. The original material to be made over is human nature with its propensity to evil, which, as Dr. Taylor stoutly contended, is not identical with an evil propensity. Instead of propensities, however, Professor Hocking speaks of instincts, and the question is how they may be transformed or remade. Central among these instincts is the will, to which Professor Hocking gives more ability than was acknowledged by Dr. Taylor's cryptic

"certainty with full power to the contrary." Will is now interpreted in such a way as to emphasize its intellectual elements. "Will in the last analysis is thought assuming control of reality" (p. 81), and consequently the transformation of the will is accomplished by the education of thought. The will is more closely defined as "the will to power" (the author was heroic, writing while the war was on, to keep the ominous phrase, although its fangs are effectually drawn), which, beginning as power *over*, is remade into power *for*, that is, selfishness is converted into service. How is this accomplished? In social conditions, generally considered, this instinct like others (pugnacity is taken as an example) has a natural dialectic of its own; but the process is hastened by the closer application of the selected best of these conditions through the institutions of the State, such as laws and schools, and most of all by the "divine aggressiveness," which is the author's way of putting the doctrine of grace. As the will to power is central among the instincts, all others should be correlated to it harmoniously. But it frequently happens that indulgence of other instincts contradicts the better idea lying behind the will to power; this is sin, and its punishment, remorse, means the emphatic reaffirmation of the denied idea.

It would be unjust to both author and reader to summarize the argument any further. Surely enough has been said to indicate that it is an exceptionally rich and rewarding book, which no one interested in the sort of questions to which the HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW is devoted can afford to neglect.

W. W. FENN.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

MORAL VALUES. A STUDY OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT. WALTER GOODNOW EVERETT, Ph.D. Henry Holt & Co. 1918. Pp. xiii, 431.

This is a book of which it is difficult not to speak in terms of enthusiastic admiration. Its greatness, however, does not lie in any one special feature that the reviewer could readily single out and emphasize. Great is the work as a whole, as the elaborate exposition of one central thesis, the systematic unfolding of one fundamental conception. Luminously simple is the ruling idea; it is the sustained and consistent application of it which reveals its depth. It has in common with all genuinely great ideas the distinction of being at once simple and profound.

So simple is the underlying theme of *Moral Values* that it can be stated in a few words. If one word could suggest Professor Everett's

moral philosophy, that word would be "sanity," in the sense in which Charles Lamb uses it as "the admirable balance of all the faculties," lack of sanity being "the disproportionate straining or excess of any of them." Indeed, nothing simpler and nothing more complex than the sane life is what Professor Everett defines as the moral life.

Of this philosophy of sanity, if it may be so described, only a few salient ideas can here be noted. "Ethics," according to the author, "is concerned with nothing less than the whole business of living" (p. 8). It is not the task of morality to create "a totally new life, but to bring order into the life that now is; not to break the will or uproot the desires that pulse within us, but to reveal their true meaning and to bring them into more complete harmony" (p. 35). Thus it may be seen that "morality is as wide as are the interests of life, and must extend to the control of every part of its manifold content. It is no separate interest but the principle of the order and harmony of all interests, the law of the whole" (p. 217). For this reason, no one *particular* good can be defined as the goal of our moral endeavor. "The perfect good . . . cannot be found in any single aspect of our nature, however exalted, but only in the integrity of all its parts and the harmonious realization of them as a whole" (p. 201). The content of the good life, therefore, must be sought in the rich totality of our human nature, nothing human being "alien to the moral task" (p. 187). The winning of the richest possible content of life — this is indeed "the task to which our human powers are called" (p. 161). But the moral ideal lies in the direction of "spiritual wholeness which comprehends and dominates all interests of life" (p. 220). The work of morality becomes thus creative. It is the work of unifying the interests and activities of life, "giving form and order to what would otherwise be lawless and capricious" (p. 203). Life with its natural chaos and strife is simply material out of which is to be fashioned an "inner order" and a "well-ordered polity."

The moral task thus viewed furnishes a standard for the estimate of the concrete values of life. The historical sources of these values, the relation they sustain to desire and impulse, the description of their exact meaning, the distinction between values that are instrumental and those that are intrinsic — these are problems interpreted in the light of the formal definition of ethics as "the science of values in their relation to the conduct of life as a whole." *The law of the whole* suggests in the briefest form possible the whole of the moral enterprise. It is at the basis of civilization as "the effort progressively to embody in institutions, laws, customs, and ideals,

all human values in just proportion" (p. 218). And what is progress but the extension of "the meaning of the whole"? "We of the present day regard it as our task to mould all that has since been won by science, philosophy, and religion, by political, economic, and social reconstruction, into a still richer and more harmonious order" (p. 218). The law of the whole acts as a unifying principle — "in spite of the fact that its very comprehensiveness baffles a too exact definition" (p. 220) — of the manifold goods of human life, distinguished as economic values, bodily values, values of recreation, values of association, character values, æsthetic values, intellectual values, and religious values. The resulting ideal worthy of our effort is an organic world of values, which, though a free creation, must manifest in every part the principles of unity and order. The law of the whole then with its categories of unity, order, harmony, balance, proportion — categories of sanity — is for Professor Everett a natural law as well as a moral law. Violation of this law results "in an inescapable deterioration of personality" (p. 318). The law of morality is a statement "of what ought to be, in view of what actually is" (p. 314); "it points to an ideal of good rooted in the very needs of our nature" (p. 315).

Laws in whatever realm they operate are general in nature and simple in statement. The test of their validity is both empirical and logical. The moral sphere is not exempt from the scientific requirement that a law to be true must "work" and must be inherently consistent. From this point of view, Professor Everett's procedure is strictly and eminently scientific. With the aid of a general and simple principle he has attempted to unify the manifold and complex facts and theories of conduct. Happiness and perfection, egoism and altruism, duty and conscience, virtue and freedom, and other opposing issues that have permanently held a place in ethical thought, receive here their due recognition and adjustment. "Simplicity is a merit," the author himself insists, "only when it is warranted by the data to be explained."

The critical reader, however, will feel that those problems of conduct which are bound up with metaphysical questions suffer somewhat from over-simplification. This is particularly the case in the otherwise skilful exposition of the problem of freedom. The problem of freedom is intimately linked with time and causality. Without a metaphysical interpretation of the temporal and causal structure of reality, the problem of freedom is scarcely touched. A judgment less final on this intricate question would have contributed to a greater appreciation of its complexity. The same criticism might

be urged against the author's interpretation of the relation between morality and religion. Professor Everett's analysis of religion is certainly profound, and the chapter which is devoted to it is perhaps the finest in the book. But what he claims for religion may be supplied by metaphysics. The distinction between the religious and the metaphysical attitudes toward the world is not made very clear. The impression gained is an identity either of religion and philosophy or of philosophy and morality. Here too a more critical examination of the problem would have added to its profundity.

In conclusion, a word about the form of the book. It is beautifully written. Professor Everett's language has distinction, lucidity, charm, and grace. His style is reserved and dignified, yet seldom austere; it is serene, yet always human; it is objective, yet never wholly impersonal. The book merits to be classed as a work of literary art. It manifests as a whole and in every part unity, order, balance, and proportion. It is itself a fine vindication of the principles of sanity it so earnestly teaches.

J. LOEWENBERG.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

FREEDOM AFTER EJECTION. A REVIEW OF PRESBYTERIAN AND CONGREGATIONAL NON-CONFORMITY IN ENGLAND AND WALES. Edited by ALEXANDER GORDON. Manchester University Press. 1917. Pp. vi, 393.

The manuscript here printed and very competently edited is a survey of Presbyterian and Congregational ministers in England and Wales, prepared for and certainly used by a joint body appointed in 1689 or 1690 by the Presbyterian and Congregational organizations to administer a common fund for the assistance of poor ministers and congregations. Circular letters were apparently sent out and from them the information in this survey was compiled. The entries were made over a period of two years, 1690-92, and concern both Presbyterian and Congregational ministers and churches. There is information of grants of money to ministers, of grants to congregations, and of loans and gifts to young men studying for the ministry. Such subscription-lists as exist have been published. A valuable commentary by the editor provides an unusually precise account of the origin and development of the "Happy Union," the creation of the common fund and its administration, the vital split between the denominations, and the creation of two funds. The records also throw considerable detail upon the case of Richard Davis

of Rothwell and the controversies created by him and relating to him.

It has always been easy to secure information about doctrinal controversies, theoretical notions about church government, and biographical details of most religious movements. Certainly the history of Non-Conformity has abounded in such detail, not only before but after the Restoration. The institutional aspects of religious history are more important but more difficult to treat, and it is to this phase of the subject that this volume refers. Indeed the historical issue has always been of comparatively greater importance to the Non-Conformists than to the Established Church, and in particular, it has been vital for the Non-Conformists of all types in England and Wales to trace their historical antecedents and establish a literal continuity with the early movement of which so much has been written. Where church government has played so large a part in the history of the sect itself, the exact origin of those notions of church government can never be a matter of indifference to those who at present espouse and practice it. This document makes far clearer than ever before the fact that the continuity of the present Presbyterian and Congregational churches in England and Wales is to be traced to the years immediately subsequent to the Glorious Revolution. Light is thrown upon the attempted amalgamation of the two churches, and the exact time and manner of their separation, from which moment they have preserved distinct organizations down to the present day.

There is also vital information upon the finances of both organizations under the voluntary system which has been necessarily characteristic of them in a country where the Established Church could alone command the support of the State. Financial questions of the gravest difficulty the Established Church itself was unable to solve during the seventeenth century, and these same problems presented themselves to the Non-Conformist bodies, creating there also almost insuperable difficulties. Again comes the question of the relation of laity and clergy, and their relative authority or lack of authority in administration and jurisdiction. From the first it had been clear that the power of the purse was in the hands of the laity. From the first the clergy had claimed that doctrinal learning and the "gift of prophecy" gave them the paramount, if not exclusive, right to authority. There is much evidence in this volume of the later phase of the struggle between the laity and the clergy to achieve some sort of adjustment. Scarcely secondary in importance was the question of the relative influence upon the policy and affairs

of the churches of the gentry and of the "common sort." Should there be a democratic system in which each man's vote should be as good as another's, or should the Church accept and therefore perpetuate the social and economic distinctions of the temporal world?

Beside these great and fundamental issues there is material of the utmost importance in regard to the personnel, both of clergy and laity, the size of congregations, their geographical location, the relative strength of Presbyterianism as contrasted with Congregationalism, and the comparative financial strength of ministers, prominent laymen, and congregations in the aggregate.

The general conclusion to which the study of this material seems to lead, is that both the Presbyterian and Congregational bodies were smaller in number at the end of the seventeenth century than one would expect, after a century of active propaganda and the ascendancy of Non-Conformity during the Civil Wars, the Ejection to the contrary notwithstanding. It is hard to suppose that the number of professed believers could ever have reached in the earlier years of the century the numbers so confidently enumerated, and have then suffered by mere force of the Restoration and its policies alone any such decimation. The manuscript enumerates 759 ministers. Unquestionably it does not contain a full count; but even if that number is doubled and trebled, it is still far from the figures often quoted for earlier years. The personnel of the ministers and the laity alike is less distinguished than at earlier periods. Fewer of the former are university graduates or perhaps competent students without a degree, and fewer of the latter are men or women of rank and station, though some still seem to be men of wealth.

Comparatively, though not actually, however, the poverty of both Presbyterians and Congregationalists, taken as a whole, seems to be greater than before; the financial problem a greater obstacle to their growth, and its difficulties increasing rather than decreasing. There is lack of evidence of that readiness of the laity voluntarily to contribute considerable sums for the support of their own ministers and of needy congregations which the history of the movement previous to 1640 supplies in abundance. The subscriptions recorded to the common fund are all small, and the larger come from the clergy and not from the laity; a matter which will certainly bear some further investigation. Where did the clergy get it? For the record seems clearly to distinguish between money contributed by the clergy themselves, and the money which they merely collected. It is certainly erroneous to say, as apparently the editor

does (p. 163), that the subsidizing of the clergy by the collection of a common fund began in 1662. Certainly in the very earliest days of the movement in 1583 and 1584, a fund of money was collected by the ministers in London from prominent laymen, was administered and parceled out by these same ministers in precisely the same manner as this fund. The practice continued certainly till 1592, but was then apparently for some years discontinued, owing to the active opposition of the government to the Classis movement. The historical continuity therefore was lost. The collection of funds and their distribution was resumed on a much larger scale under James and Charles. This whole question of the financing of the Puritan movement is one of the greatest importance and of the deepest interest, but to which as yet very little attention has been given.

This record makes it clear that relatively to the economic progress of the community and the general rise in prices and wages, the pay of the ministers had fallen off considerably. There are a good many in 1690 receiving less than £20, many with £10 or less. In the earlier days even the less prominent and able members had received stipends as large as £30 and £40, while £50 and £60 contributed by a relatively small congregation or by one layman was by no means uncommon. Those figures represent apparently the maximum which all but the most influential ministers could hope to obtain in 1690. Is it not possible that in this inability of both the Presbyterian and Congregational churches to obtain the same relative financial support as in the earlier decades, lies some explanation of their comparative loss of position and influence in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries?

ROLAND G. USHER.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY.

CHURCH AND STATE IN ENGLAND TO THE DEATH OF QUEEN ANNE. HENRY M. GWATKIN. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1917. Pp. viii, 416. \$5.00.

Dr. Gwatkin had made an eminent reputation in the field of early church history; and it is deeply to be regretted that a volume by him, dealing with a subject for which he showed no special qualifications, should have been published without the changes he would doubtless have wished to make. It is, frankly, a book that has no other value than that of a pedestrian narrative of obvious events without any real understanding of their perspective. Dr. Gwatkin seems rarely to have been abreast of modern research, and he unfailingly writes

with prejudice, once his own sympathies are engaged. He has little of that knowledge of constitutional history so essential to his subject. He does not understand the reign of Richard II, which he interprets in the spirit of "Little Arthur's History"; he does not know the causes of the struggle between Becket and Henry II in 1163; he knows nothing of Maitland's fundamental paper on *Execrabilis* in the Common Pleas; he has not examined Dr. Leach's work on the effect of the dissolution of the chantries; it would be astonishing, in view of his statements, if he had ever read the *Institutes of a Christian Man*.

These are perhaps sins of omission. But it is to be doubted whether Dr. Gwatkin really understood wherein consists the problem of Church and State, as English history interprets it. He does not seem to have realized that from the Conciliar Movement England was plunged into the mid-stream of European thought; a cautious Scottish monarch would not have brought Casaubon to this country for nothing. He does not see the significance of men like Tyndal and Cartwright and Sherlock, whose writings go to the roots of the problems they confronted. The real history of Church and State is not merely, as he makes it, a statistical table of events. It is the presentation of the conflict between divergent views of life, the explanation of their origin, the interpretation of their value. In this aspect Becket is not merely an English but a European figure; and the Statutes of Provisors and *Præmunire* are landmarks in the history of the secular State. The subject Dr. Gwatkin chose for these lectures is a great one; but such dignified anecdote is inadequate to its treatment.

HAROLD J. LASKI.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

GOD'S WONDER WORLD. A MANUAL FOR RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION IN JUNIOR GRADES. Together with Leaflets. CORA S. COBB. The Beacon Press. Pp. 335. \$1.25. Leaflets, 50 cts.

"The religious thought running through all these Lessons — that God is with us continually and leads us on to all that we accomplish — should never be lost from sight." This assertion (p. 250) informs the inquirer at once of the intention of the author. It is to lead children into a region where investigation will reward them with fascinating discoveries, and where they will constantly explore with delight, with reverence, and with consciousness of God. The ways of ants, bees, spiders, toads, bats, and owls; clouds, plants, and

trees; the work of the rain, the story of electricity — these and many other things are brought within the comprehension of children, and many suggestions are given as to leading a child to think and observe for himself. While there may be room for question as to the form in which some of these facts are presented, the book will be an invaluable assistant to both parent and teacher.

THE EXPERIENCE OF GOD IN MODERN LIFE. EUGENE WILLIAM LYMAN.
Charles Scribner's Sons. 1918. Pp. x, 154. \$1.00.

Professor Lyman's peculiar designation of his theme in a work which seeks to show the compatibility of the Christian conception of God with the mental habits of a modern educated man, reminds one of Hocking's *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, and, like it, is rather ambiguously suggestive of the apologetic method of the mystics. At first glance it seems to mean that modern life in its highest interpretation may be truly regarded as a divine experience, that is, an experience on the part of God Himself. It may also mean that men of the present day enjoy an objective experience of God, whereby He becomes as real to them as any other fact can be. This is evidently what the author means to say, for he speaks repeatedly of men consciously experiencing God, of this as an experience of objective reality, of God as "a fact" (pp. 11, 14, 31, 35, *et al.*). The position is that of the theological realist.

As the argument proceeds, however, the position seems to shift to the first of the two suggestions. For the claim made by some to the effect that they know God to be real because in certain definite experiences of theirs they feel an immediate assurance of His objective existence, is supported on the ground of the high quality of this experience. The author's favorite designation of its character is that it is an experience of "moral creativity." That is, the man has an experience of bringing new moral existence into being; there is no "world ready-made" but a "world in the making," and this is an experience of God, since God's nature is ultimately "moral creativeness." In this activity therefore man is one with God. The divine experience and his own are one. In man's moral career there is a divine experience. Man's moral creativity is God's own experience. Thus the author's realism becomes a form of mysticism. Is this God personal?

An effort is made to vindicate this claim on behalf of modern religious experience on three counts: its power in the development

of personality, its furtherance of social progress, and its contribution to the evolution of the cosmos. This seems the natural order in covering the whole field which apologetics must examine. The treatment, however, lacks integration. The three counts are taken separately, whereas they might be unified by showing how the personality comes to consciousness only in the community-consciousness and finds fulfilment only when the cosmos becomes organic to its self-expression and self-realization. The value of the work lies in its suggestiveness rather than in thoroughness. The author deeply feels that the belief in the existence of God needs vindication anew and that this vindication must proceed from within the human conscious experience; but the conclusions he reaches are anticipated by saltations and not reached by clear and coördinated reasoning.

The philosophical instrument mainly employed in obtaining results is Pragmatism, with some assistance from such works as Hobhouse's *Development and Purpose* and Bergson's *Creative Evolution*. The tentative character of the treatment is thereby accentuated, and brilliancy of suggestion alternates with obscurity of expression and far-reaching assumption. The terms, *reality*, *fact*, *experience*, *religion*, though key-words, are of uncertain meaning. The opening sentence, "The modern world is in quest, dumbly and half-consciously, of a religion," is in substance often repeated. But is religion something that men get and lose, or something that they seek? Is not their very seeking their religion? The testimony of such great men as Martineau, Bushnell, Ritschl, and Tolstoy to the reality of the experience of God is taken at its face value, but the proof of the truth of their utterances is found in "the reality sense," "a sense of being in contact with reality in a new and deeper way and of functioning harmoniously with it," "an experience sufficiently grounded in reality," "the feeling of reality" (pp. 32, 37, 43); which is surely unconvincing to any one who has not had that incommunicable experience. In his peroration and summary at the close the author frankly, it seems, abandons any attempt to reason with his readers: "In all these experiences fact and value meet and blend both in human ways and in ways that reach far beyond the confines of humanity. Experiences, *we irresistibly feel* [*italics mine*] are experiences of God. They reveal to us the very essence of creative power and they bring us into a veritable sharing in the creative process." If one is to be convinced finally simply by the irresistible feeling some one may have, there is an end to argument and theology must repose on dogmatism.

The aim of these lectures is a noble one, namely, to arouse a desire to share in the Christian fellowship with the will of God, and the area

of human endeavor opened to view is full of hope and promise; but it can be conquered only by a more stringent exercise of the unified powers of feeling, thought, and will than the author allows.

GEORGE CROSS.

ROCHESTER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

MYSTICISM AND LOGIC. BERTRAND RUSSELL. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1918. Pp. viii, 234. \$2.50.

In this new volume Mr. Russell has brought together ten essays and addresses, previously printed elsewhere, the first of which gives its title to the collection. After the admirable account of Mr. Russell's philosophy recently given by Dr. Hoernlé in the pages of this REVIEW,¹ it would be superfluous to say anything further here. In the Preface, however, there is a reference to the essay on *The Free Man's Worship* which suggests that the author anticipated or has profited by one of Dr. Hoernlé's criticisms — "In theoretical Ethics the position . . . is not quite identical with that which I hold now. I feel less convinced than I did then of the objectivity of good and evil." In the case of other essays also, dated footnotes correct statements in the earlier text. Is it impertinent to suggest that such indications of changing thought should lead Mr. Russell to soften somewhat his dogmatic tone — although he would indignantly protest against the adjective. He has a shocking way of dashing cold water upon one's glowing ideals and ardent hopes of realizing them in the world; but a cold shower is stimulating to a healthy system.

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¹The Religious Aspect of Bertrand Russell's Philosophy. R. F. A. Hoernlé. HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, April, 1916.